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 RETHINKING CHAPTER 13 
Lawrence Ponoroff* 
As was true of its predecessor under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, chapter 13 of the 
Federal Bankruptcy Code has never worked out as well as Congress hoped. 
Intended to be a superior vehicle to liquidation that allows a debtor to retain her 
nonexempt property and some measure of self-respect, debtors have instead 
overwhelmingly chosen to eschew chapter 13 in favor of obtaining a chapter 7 
discharge and moving along with their fresh start. This Article adopts the position 
that the concept of individual debt adjustment has merit; it has just not been 
constructed properly and, in recent years, Congress’s efforts in the field have been 
a step in the wrong direction. This Article maintains that by employing the 
conceptual model of settlement, with its entailments of cooperation and reasonable 
accommodation, many of the current issues plaguing chapter 13 can be resolved. 
Furthermore, future reform can produce a vibrant and useful facility for individual 
debt adjustment that redounds to the benefit of not only system participants, but 
also the aggregate social good. 
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“Some debts are fun when you are acquiring them, but none are fun when you set 
about retiring them.”** 
INTRODUCTION 
From the start, Congress has had an almost unnatural affinity for 
repayment under chapter 13 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code1 over liquidation 
under chapter 7 for individual-consumer debtors. Frustrated, however, by the 
failure of most consumer debtors to appreciate what Congress had considered to be 
the advantages for them in chapter 13 compared with chapter 7, Congress slowly 
began to replace the honey with vinegar to assure that debtors would make the 
“right” choice. This trend reached a crescendo in 2005,2 but by then, Congress 
seemed far more preoccupied with controlling what it perceived to be abuse of 
chapter 7 than with providing debtors a superior alternative to straight bankruptcy.3 
In any case, chapter 13, as currently constituted, is deeply debilitated. 
Empirically, an overwhelming majority of chapter 13 cases never achieve plan 
                                                                                                                
 ** Ogden Nash Quote, IZ QUOTES, http://izquotes.com/quote/133992 (last 
visited Jan. 11, 2017). 
 1. The current law of bankruptcy is found in title 11 of the United States Code. 
11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 (2012) amended by Pub. L. No. 114-254, 130 Stat. 1005. It was 
enacted on November 6, 1978 as the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 
92 Stat. 2549, and governs all cases filed on or after October 1, 1979 (the “1978 Act”). In 
the text of this Article, except where otherwise indicated, all references herein to the “Code” 
or the “Bankruptcy Code” are to title 11 of the U.S. Code as amended through December 
10, 2016. 
 2. Two thousand and five saw the enactment of the most sweeping set of 
amendments to the Code with the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”), Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.). Moreover, while the personal bankruptcy provisions of the 
bill received the bulk of the attention in this respect, the limitations extended to business 
cases as well. See generally George H. Singer, The New Rules of Bankruptcy for Chapter 11 
Business Reorganizations Under B.A.P.C.P.A., 28 CAL. BANKR. J. 194 (2006). 
 3. BAPCPA was largely a response to the perception that individual debtors 
were engaging in widespread misuse of the bankruptcy system and the belief that 
bankruptcy judges were not sufficiently vigilant in policing such abuses. See generally Jean 
Braucher, The Challenge to the Bench and Bar Presented by the 2005 Bankruptcy Act: 
Resistance Need Not Be Futile, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 93, 94 (observing that the subtext of 
BAPCPA “was the view that bankruptcy judges and consumer debtors’ lawyers needed to 
be reined in to keep them from facilitating abuse by consumer debtors”); Susan Jensen, A 
Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 
2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485, 485–93 (2005). The original antecedent to the legislation 
emanated from the dissent to the 1997 Report of the National Bankruptcy Review 
Commission. Jensen, supra; see also NAT’L BANKR. REVIEW COMM’N, BANKRUPTCY: THE 
NEXT TWENTY YEARS, 1029 (1997), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/report/01title.pdf 
[hereinafter NBRC REPORT] (“Chapter 5 Individual Commissioner Views”). 
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completion and discharge,4 and chapter 13 has come under heavy criticism in the 
academic community.5 In addition, chapter 13 cases have always been subject to 
an enormous amount of local and regional variation,6 although recently efforts 
                                                                                                                
 4. See NBRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 90 (reporting completion rate of 32% in 
chapter 13); Charles M. Foster & Stephen L. Poe, Consumer Bankruptcy: A Proposal to 
Reform Chapters 7 and 13 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 104 DICK. L. REV. 579, 589 (2000) 
(noting only one-third of chapter 13 filers were able to complete repayment plans, and many 
were only able to make minimal repayment); Scott F. Norberg & Andrew J. Velkey, Debtor 
Discharge and Creditor Repayment in Chapter 13, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 473, 476 (2006) 
(finding a 33% completion rate in a seven-district study for plans of chapter 13 debtors who 
filed in 1994); William C. Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized Justice: Consumer 
Bankruptcy as Consumer Protection, and Consumer Protection in Consumer Bankruptcy, 
68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 397, 410–11 (1994) (reporting 31% average completion rate across the 
country). It would be an exaggeration, however, to label all such cases as “failures.” A 
chapter 13 case that stops an imminent foreclosure or provides some other temporary relief 
is not necessarily a failure just because plan payments are never completed or a discharge is 
never granted. See, e.g., Branigan v. Bateman (In re Bateman), 515 F.3d 272, 283 (4th Cir. 
2008) (noting the protections or benefits available under chapter 13, other than discharge, 
that might be incentive for a debtor to file for relief even when discharge is not available). 
 5. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, A Fresh Start for Personal Bankruptcy Reform: The 
Need for Simplification and a Single Portal, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1295, 1320–21 (2006) 
(predicting that the net result of BAPCPA would be even lower rates of usage, even less 
plan completion, and even less unsecured debt repayment than under prior law); Katherine 
Porter, The Pretend Solution: An Empirical Study of Bankruptcy Outcomes, 90 TEX. L. REV. 
103, 113 (2011). (“Chapter 13 is a social program that does not work as intended but is not 
critiqued or reformed because its flaws are hidden. The consumer bankruptcy system fits 
this description, as the data show. . . . [T]he systemic failure of [c]hapter 13 has existed for 
decades.”). Calls to repeal chapter 13 can be found early on after the enactment of the Code. 
See William C. Whitford, Has the Time Come to Repeal Chapter 13?, 65 IND. L.J. 85 
(1989) (discussing the low completion rate, the significant difference in practices from 
district to district, the lack of explanation for the frequency of use of chapter 13 as opposed 
to chapter 7, and the phenomenon of debtors’ lawyers steering debtors into chapter 13 
because of pressure from judges and trustees); see also Karen Gross, The Debtor as Modern 
Day Peon: A Problem of Unconstitutional Conditions, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 165, 166 
(1990) (criticizing required repayment as a condition to discharge); c.f. Timothy W. Dixon 
& David G. Epstein, Where Did Chapter 13 Come From and Where Should It Go? 10 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 741, 747–63 (2002) (expressing ambivalence about the future of 
chapter 13). 
 6. In its Final Report, the Commission was established by Congress in 1970 to 
“study, evaluate and recommend changes to [the existing bankruptcy law].” 14 Act of July 
24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 86 Stat. 468, noted the surprisingly wide variation in rates of 
usage of former chapter XIII from district to district. See COMM’N ON THE BANKR. LAWS OF 
THE U.S., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, 
H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 156–57 (1973). With respect to the 
diversity of the practice under the Code, see Daniel A. Austin, Bankruptcy and the Myth of 
“Uniform Law,” 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1081 (2012); Jean Braucher, Lawyers and 
Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 67 AM. BANKR L.J. 501 (1993); and 
Scott F. Norberg & Nadja Schreiber Compo, Report on an Empirical Study of District 
Variations, and the Role of Judges, Trustees and Debtors’ Attorneys in Chapter 13 
Bankruptcy Cases, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 431 (2007). There have also been some recent 
 
4 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 59:1 
have been made to mitigate the highly customized, and thus disparate, nature of 
the practice.7 Finally, the law governing modification of a confirmed chapter 13 
plan is in a state of near chaos.8  
In short, the complex array of carrots and sticks that Congress has put in 
place over the last nearly 40 years to make chapter 13 the chapter of choice for 
“can-pay” debtors is simply not working. The timing is propitious, therefore, to 
theorize about the exact role chapter 13 should play in our contemporary 
bankruptcy system, so that its current features, as well as subsequent proposals for 
reform, can be evaluated for consistency with an idealized understanding of a 
workable system of individual debt adjustment. 
In an article written several years ago, Professor David Carlson used a 
bargain metaphor to offer a “unifying theory” of chapter 13.9 Specifically, he 
analogized the chapter 13 plan to a purchase and sale transaction where the debtor 
essentially buys back the nonexempt assets of the estate with future income; 
something that is, of course, excluded from the bankruptcy estate in chapter 7 
cases.10 He thus conceptualized the estate assets as “principal” that, pursuant to the 
chapter 13 bargain, goes to the debtor, and disposable post-confirmation income as 
“interest” belonging to creditors. From this ideation of chapter 13, he concluded 
that any subsequent modification of the plan must honor the original bargain; 
creditors may not invade principal by forcing the liquidation of assets,11 and 
                                                                                                                
studies suggesting a kind of subconscious racism that accounts for a greater proportion of 
black debtors placed in chapter 13 than white debtors. See, e.g., Jean Braucher et al., Race 
Disparity in Bankruptcy Chapter Choice and the Role of Debtors’ Attorneys, 20 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 611 (2012); Mechele Dickerson, Racial Steering in Bankruptcy, 20 
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 623 (2012). 
 7. The Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules to the Judicial Conference of 
the United States has led this effort by proposing uniform procedures over areas that 
previously were subject to considerable variation from district to district, such as FED R. 
BANKR. P. 3001(c)(2) and 3002.1, which became effective on December 1, 2011 (resolving 
the prior discord in the case law over whether postpetition charges imposed by mortgage 
lenders in “cure and maintain” plans required prior notice and court approval). In addition, 
the Committee is currently working on a national chapter 13 plan form. See COMM. ON 
RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PROPOSED 
AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE 11–16 (July 2016), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/preliminary_draft_2016-07-01.pdf; see also Sara 
S. Greene et al., Countering Culture: An Empirical Analysis of Consumer Bankruptcy 
Success, 101 MINN. L. REV. (2017) (draft on file with the author) (arguing that the data show 
that the supposed impact of “local legal culture” as an excuse to forego national reform of 
chapter 13 is misguided). 
 8. See infra Section III.E. 
 9. David Gray Carlson, Modified Plans of Reorganization and the Basic 
Chapter 13 Bargain, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 585 (2009). 
 10. Id. at 588–89. This is of course the reverse of the bargain in chapter 7 where, 
in return for surrender of her nonexempt assets, the debtor receives a discharge. 
 11. This understanding leads Carlson to conclude that recalculation of the best 
interests test under § 1325(a)(4) should never be revisited because the effect may force the 
debtor to liquidate assets in violation of the chapter 13 bargain in order to avoid dismissal or 
conversion. Id. at 599–605. 
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debtors may not appropriate interest by forcing the re-bifurcation of a secured 
claim.12 
Professor Carlson’s chapter 13 bargain model has considerable 
explanatory power and does offer a practical benchmark for evaluating issues that 
arise during the course of a chapter 13 case. Ultimately, however, it lacks a 
normative axis. That is to say, it provides a descriptive version of what chapter 13 
is and how it operates but offers no particular view of what the major constituent 
elements of the chapter 13 bargain ought to be—an undertaking that, in fairness, 
Carlson did not set out to provide. This Article supplies an alternative bargain 
metaphor that will measure not only the correctness of the opposing positions 
taken on key chapter 13 issues in the decisional law, but also the adequacy and 
efficacy of the law’s current features. 
This Article’s basic premise envisions chapter 13 not as a sale of estate 
assets to the debtor in return for access to future income, but rather as the 
“settlement” of a cluster of disputed claims. Thus, this Article’s conceptual point 
of origin likewise finds its ontological origins in contract law. Of course, it is not 
the apotheosis of the consensual agreement imagined under classical contract-law 
principles.13 Among other differences, the chapter 13 settlement is involuntary; 
creditors do not have the right to vote and cannot force a debtor who complies with 
chapter 13’s confirmation requirements out of bankruptcy or into another debtor-
relief chapter of the Code. Chapter 13 also implicates inter-creditor issues in a 
manner that does not exist under the conventional model of assent.14 Nonetheless, 
the “bargain” concept has persisted in efforts to explicate and understand the 
bankruptcy system, going back to Tom Jackson’s legendary “creditor’s bargain” 
model,15 an approach that Carlson himself found considerably less than 
satisfying.16 
The entailments of a settlement analogy also differ from those of a 
traditional transaction of purchase and sale. Most prominently, they require 
examination of the value of the claim being compromised in order to evaluate the 
                                                                                                                
 12. Id. at 649–52. This occurs when the debtor seeks modification for purposes 
of surrendering collateral that the plan had originally contemplated would be retained. See 
infra notes 176–85 and accompanying text. 
 13. The traditional model of assent is premised on bargains of relatively short 
duration, characterized by voluntariness, infrequency, simplicity, and directness. See, e.g., 
Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, 
Neoclassical and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 862–65 (1978). 
 14. This point is reflected in a variety of places, but quite noticeably in the 
ability of a chapter 13 debtor to classify among unsecured claimants under 11 U.S.C. § 
1322(b)(1) (2012). 
 15. THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW (1986) 
(setting forth basic principles of bankruptcy law and presenting bankruptcy as a system of 
contracts between creditors); Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy 
Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982). 
 16. See David Gray Carlson, Philosophy in Bankruptcy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 
1388 (1987) (reviewing THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 
(1986)). Carlson described Jackson’s book as “unremittingly dreadful.” Id.  
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terms of the settlement to be imposed on debtors and creditors, as well as 
consideration of the additional costs associated with pursuing (and defending) the 
claim to final adjudication.17 “Value,” however, has a different meaning in the 
bankruptcy context than it does under state law. While creditors mostly do bring 
their state law rights, entitlements, and priorities into the chapter 13 case,18 they 
are not necessarily treated in the same manner as they would be under state law.19 
Thus, the “merits” of a claim need to be assessed not in the orthodox sense of the 
claim’s validity or dollar value, but rather through the lens of the unique 
bankruptcy policy aims, including fresh start, rehabilitation, and equality. Also, in 
this sense, the bargain does not need to be the one that the parties would have 
agreed upon if given the opportunity to negotiate in advance. Rather, the 
settlement analogy is an imaginative construct to be used in developing a 
framework that, once imposed on the interested parties to a chapter 13 case, serves 
social policy objectives and maintains systemic integrity.20 It is this fact that 
permits an appraisal of chapter 13 in its current embodiment—not necessarily to 
provide more or less debtor protection or creditor relief, but rather with an eye 
toward fashioning a useful and equitable system of rehabilitation for individual 
debtors. 
To achieve these ends, this Article begins in Part I with an overview of 
the purposes and policies behind including a procedure for individual debt 
adjustment within our system of bankruptcy laws. Part II explains the basics of the 
settlement model and then imports the concept into the chapter 13 realm by 
discussing how the debtor and creditors are properly correlated with the parties to 
                                                                                                                
 17. The complicated process of risk-and-cost analysis, modeling, and 
management has become an industry unto itself. See generally Marc B. Victor, The Proper 
Use of Decision Analysis to Assist Litigation Strategy, 40 BUS. LAW. 617 (1985); Kris 
Steckman, Note and Comment, Market-Based Prediction Models as an Aid to Litigation 
Strategy and Settlement Negotiations, 2 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 244 (2008). 
Companies have sprung up whose sole raison d’etre is assessment of settlement valuations. 
See, e.g., LITIGATION RISK MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE, http://litigationriskmanagement.com/ 
(last visited Jan. 4, 2017).  
 18. This proposition is often referred to as the Butner principle, in homage to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (holding that, 
unless some federal interest requires a different result, property interests should be analyzed 
no differently in bankruptcy than under state law). 
 19. Butner is often accorded a much more sweeping interpretation than it 
warrants. In fact, the holding in that case does no more than negatively express the basic 
truism that when a state-property-law definition interferes with federal bankruptcy policy, 
the state-law rule is preempted under the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution. For 
example, in Kanter v. Moneymaker (In re Kanter), 502 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1974), the Ninth 
Circuit invalidated a state statute that purported to defease the bankruptcy trustee of any 
interest in a prepetition-personal-injury lawsuit. The court found that enforcement of that 
provision directly conflicted with the provisions of the former Bankruptcy Act’s definition 
of estate property, as well as with the overall distributional priority scheme the Act 
established. Id. at 230–31; see also In re Pruitt, 401 B.R. 546, 564 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2009) 
(suggesting that many courts read Butner too broadly). 
 20. See infra note 52 and accompanying text (exploring the normative role of 
bankruptcy law in society). 
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a conventional civil lawsuit. Next, building on the discussion in Part II, Part III 
takes each of the critical components of a chapter 13 case and maps them against 
how the statute might look if recrafted along the lines of the settlement analogy, 
producing what this Article refers to as a “new chapter 13.” This Part also 
addresses how some of the most controversial issues under chapter 13 would be 
resolved by employing the settlement analogy. Finally, recognizing the limitations 
and artificialities inherent in any attempt at a holistic theory, Part IV offers a 
realistic assessment of certain aspects of the process that are eclipsed or unduly 
diminished by employment of this approach. 
I. CHAPTER 13 
The precursor to chapter 13 was chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act of 
1898 (“1898 Act”).21 At the time it was added to the law by the Chandler Act of 
1938,22 Congress believed that debtors would be eager to use this less-stigmatizing 
alternative to liquidation.23 They were wrong. By the time serious discussion of 
bankruptcy reform began in the 1970s, it was clear that chapter XIII was not 
working well.24  A number of features of the law were identified as responsible for 
this failing, but the most nettlesome included the following: (1) the requirement of 
creditor approval (voting) for plan confirmation;25 (2) the limitation of eligibility 
                                                                                                                
 21. See Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, repealed by Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549; see also David G. Epstein, New 
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, New Lundin on BAPCPA Chapter 13 Bankruptcy: An 
Essay Disguised as a Book Review About a Treatise Disguised as a Supplement, 1 
CHARLESTON L. REV. 37, 37 (2006) (“Chapter XIII was ‘invented’ by Valentine J. Nesbit, a 
South Carolinian who had moved to Birmingham.”) 
 22. Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, repealed by Act of Nov. 6, 
1978, Pub. L. No. 95–598, 92 Stat. 2549. 
 23. DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN 
AMERICA 133 (2001). 
 24.  This view was reflected in the Senate Report accompanying the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978:  
In theory, the basic purpose of Chapter XIII has been to permit an 
individual to pay his debts and avoid bankruptcy by making periodic 
payments to a trustee under bankruptcy court protection, with the trustee 
fairly distributing the funds deposited to creditors until all debts have 
been paid. The hearings record and the bankruptcy literature show 
uniform support for this principle. In practice, however, the results have 
been less than satisfactory, [even] though chapter XIII has been 
available since 1938.  
S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 12 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5798. 
 25. Chandler Act § 651, 52 Stat. at 934 (requiring acceptance by all affected 
creditors); Id. at § 652, 52 Stat. at 934 (requiring confirmation by a majority of the creditors 
for plans not accepted unanimously). 
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to wage earners;26 (3) the full applicability of the discharge exceptions; and (4) the 
lack of a maximum plan duration.27 
Congress’s solution was chapter 13, featuring statutorily prescribed 
confirmation standards in lieu of creditor voting,28 eligibility for any individual 
with regular income,29 the promise of the “superdischarge” upon plan 
completion,30 and a three-year fixed term as the norm.31 In an article written 
contemporaneously with chapter 13’s enactment, Judge Joe Lee opined, “Chapter 
13 is a more attractive alternative to straight bankruptcy for consumer debtors than 
was [c]hapter XIII.”32 The basic structure of the old chapter XIII, however, 
remained intact. The debtor would retain possession of her property and enjoy the 
exclusive right to propose a plan,33 with the amounts to be paid to secured and 
unsecured creditors determined under principles of composition and extension, 
aided by authority to cure prepetition defaults and deaccelerate claims.34 
Moreover, large business debtors would be precluded from obtaining relief under 
chapter 13.35 
                                                                                                                
 26. Id. at § 606(8), 52 Stat. at 931 (defining “wage earner” as “an individual 
whose primary income is derived from wages, salary, or commissions.”).  
 27. See S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 12–13 (1977) (identifying some of the problems 
with chapter XIII). Under chapter XIII, a court, however, could grant a discharge at the end 
of three years even if the plan was not completed owing to circumstances for which the 
court determined that the debtor ought not be held accountable. Id. at § 661, 52 Stat. at 936. 
Some argued that as a practical matter, this provision imposed a limitation of three years for 
the duration of a plan. See, e.g., William K. Adam, Should Chapter XIII Bankruptcy Be 
Involuntary?, 44 TEX. L. REV. 533, 540 n.72 (1966). For a concise overview of chapter XIII, 
see Susan Jensen-Conklin, Nondischargeable Debts in Chapter 13: “Fresh Start” or 
“Haven for Criminals”?, 7 BANKR. DEV. J. 517, 520–23 (1990). 
 28. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (2012). 
 29. See id. §§ 109(e); 101(30). 
 30. In its original form, § 1328(a) only excepted two types of debt from the full-
payment discharge: (1) debts on which the last scheduled payment was due after the end of 
the plan; and (2) debts for domestic support obligations falling under § 523(a)(5). 11 U.S.C. 
§1328(a) (1978), amended by Act of Apr. 20, 2005. 
 31. See infra note 45. 
 32. Joe Lee, Chapter 13 nee Chapter XIII, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 303, 326 (1979). 
However, Judge Lee’s prediction that “[t]he objectives of the draftsmen of chapter 13, to 
promote greater use of the chapter and in turn obtain a greater return for creditors in 
consumer bankruptcy cases, may very well be realized,” turned out to be overly optimistic. 
Id. The legislative history also painted an overly rosy view of things: “The premises of the 
bill with respect to consumer bankruptcy are that the use of the bankruptcy law should be a 
last resort; that if it is used, debtors should attempt repayment under chapter 13, Adjustment 
of Debts of an Individual with Regular Income; and finally, whether the debtor uses chapter 
7, Liquidation, or chapter 13, Adjustment of Debts of an Individual, bankruptcy relief 
should be effective, and should provide the debtor with a fresh start.” See H. R. REP. NO. 
95-595, ch. 3, at 118 (1977) as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6078 (emphasis 
added) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]. 
 33. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1306(b) (1986); 1321 (1978). 
 34. See id. § 1322(b)(5); infra note 183. 
 35. See infra note 72 and accompanying text. 
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To Congress’s chagrin, however, many debtors still chose chapter 7, even 
when they might have had sufficient wherewithal and potential to successfully 
complete a chapter 13 plan.36 The response was antonymous as Congress 
simultaneously began restricting access to chapter 7 as a way of indirectly steering 
debtors into chapter 1337 and diminishing the attractiveness of chapter 13 as an 
alternative to liquidation.38 The first effort came in two waves. Initially, in 1984, 
Congress added § 707(b) to the Code, providing that dismissal of an individual-
consumer case might occur not only upon a showing of “cause” under § 707(a), 
but also if the court were to determine that the filing constituted a “substantial 
abuse” of chapter 7.39 In 2005, Congress completely overhauled § 707(b) by 
replacing judicial discretion over the determination of substantial abuse with a 
formulaic (“means”) test in § 707(b)(2) for ascertaining when a “presumption of 
abuse” would arise, warranting dismissal under § 707(b)(1).40 However, BAPCPA 
preserved the courts’ discretion to dismiss an individual-consumer debtor’s case, 
even when the debtor “passed” the means test, in the event of either bad faith or 
when, under the totality of the circumstances, the debtor’s situation demonstrated 
abuse.41 
The denuding of chapter 13 baubles occurred more gradually, beginning 
with the addition of the projected disposable income test in 1984,42 continuing 
through the dismantling of the superdischarge beginning in 1990,43 and 
culminating in BAPCPA’s myriad of amendments that made chapter 13 more 
restrictive and less inviting.44 This included extending the duration of many 
                                                                                                                
 36.   See generally Robert M. Thompson, Consumer Bankruptcy: Substantial 
Abuse and Section 707(b) of the Code, 55 MO. L. REV. 247, 249–51 (1990) (discussing a 
study conducted by the Credit Research Center at the Purdue University Krannert Graduate 
School of Management). 
 37. Debtors may not be directly placed in chapter 13. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) 
(2012); see also Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United 
States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 35 (1995) (highlighting futility and potential 
constitutional concerns as explaining Congress’s rejection of a compulsory chapter 13). 
 38.  See infra notes 42–45, 133–38 and accompanying text. 
 39. Unquestionably, § 707(b) was aimed at debtors who had the future ability to 
pay their debts, a factor that Congress did not intend to fall within the definition of “cause” 
under § 707(a). See S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 94 (1978). 
 40.  See generally Eugene R. Wedoff, Means Testing in the New §707(B), 79 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 231, 231 (2005).  
 41. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3) (2005). 
 42. See infra notes 104–05 and accompanying text. 
 43. Sections 3102–03 of the Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 
104 Stat. 4789 (1990), added §§ 1328(a)(2)–(3) to the Code, which included criminal 
restitution obligations and criminal fines and debts for personal injury resulting from 
driving under the influence among the types of debt that would be excluded from the 
superdischarge. 
 44. See generally Henry J. Sommer, Trying to Make Sense Out of Nonsense: 
Representing Consumers Under the “Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005,” 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 191, 221 (2005) (“The fact that [c]hapter 13 is 
made much less attractive reveals much about the true agenda of the bill’s proponents, who 
proclaimed their desire for more debtors to file under that chapter. The real goal of the 
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chapter 13 plans.45 Perhaps it should come as no surprise that neither approach has 
had much effect. While the means test made chapter 7 more costly and 
cumbersome,46 most debtors (and even debtors of means) manage to pass it.47 
Moreover, the prospect of living for up to five years on a near subsistence budget 
is not very appealing except in extraordinary circumstances and, even when 
undertaken, is usually unsuccessful; five years is a long time to count on clear 
skies and calm winds. Finally, as discussed more fully below,48 BAPCPA also 
tilted the table in favor of protecting the sanctity of security. This certainly had the 
effect of making chapter 13 less feasible for debtors.49 Moreover, because chapter 
13 is a zero-sum game, increasing the payout on secured claims necessarily had an 
erosive impact on the amounts available for other claimants.50 
                                                                                                                
creditor lobby was to make bankruptcy of all types more difficult for debtors who need it. In 
fact, it seems quite likely that [c]hapter 13 cases will go down, rather than up, as a 
percentage of bankruptcy filings.”); see also supra text accompanying notes 36–38. 
 45. As originally enacted in 1978, § 1322(d) limited the period of repayment 
under a plan to three years, unless, for cause, the court approved a longer period of up to but 
not exceeding five years. After BAPCPA, that rule was retained for debtors whose current 
monthly income times 12 is less than the state’s median for a family of the same size as the 
debtor’s family. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d)(2) (2012). For above-median debtors, however, 
the plan may provide for payments over a period of up to five years. See id. § 1322(d)(1). 
While these rules appear to contemplate the possibility of a plan duration of less than three 
or five years, respectively, by virtue of § 1325(b)(4)(B), such a reduction is only permitted 
if the plan provides for payment in full on all allowed unsecured claims over such shorter 
period. 
 46. See Lois R. Lupica, The Consumer Bankruptcy Fee Study: The Final Report, 
20 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 17, 30 (2012) (finding significant post-BAPCPA increase in 
the cost of access to the chapter 7 and chapter 13 consumer bankruptcy systems). 
 47. See Braucher supra note 5, at 1322 n.124. One study showed that in the 18 
months following the effective date of BAPCPA, 90% of above-median debtors (themselves 
only a small percentage of total filers) passed the means test. Clifford J. White III, Making 
Bankruptcy Reform Work: A Progress Report in Year 2, 26 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 16, 16 
(June 2007) (finding that of chapter 7 filings by above-median debtors between October 
2005 and March 2007, only 9.5% were presumed abusive); see also David Gray Carlson, 
Means Testing: The Failed Bankruptcy Revolution of 2005, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 
223, 228 (2007) (asserting that the means test has failed in its effort to force debtors with 
debt-paying ability into chapter 13); Jerry D. Truitt, The State of Bankruptcy 18 Months 
After BAPCPA, AM. BANKR. INST. J. 52, 52 (2007) (recognizing that 94% of cases filed 
were by debtors below the applicable state’s median income). Indeed, one commentator has 
suggested that the credit industry’s real objective in connection with BAPCPA was not to 
obtain greater payouts in bankruptcy, but rather to delay bankruptcy filings, thereby reaping 
continued payments and fees during the period of this deferral. Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy 
Reform and the “Sweat Box” of Credit Card Debt, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 375, 385–90 
(explaining that credit-card lenders actually profit once a borrower becomes financially 
distressed, and continue to profit so long as the debtor remains in that state). 
 48. See infra Section III.D. 
 49. See supra note 45; infra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 50. As discussed infra note 104 and accompanying text, one of the ways in 
which unsecured creditors are protected in chapter 13 is for all of the debtor’s income over 
and above necessary expenses, including payments on account of secured debt, to be 
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And so, in the face of low rates of use, high rates of noncompletion when 
employed, and low amounts of unsecured debt repayment, the question becomes 
what is to be done. The initial inquiry might be whether chapter 13 is worth 
preserving at all.51 The author of this Article believes the answer is indubitably 
affirmative. The basic policies that animate the decision to provide a facility for 
individual reorganization are sound and salutary. While the scope of bankruptcy 
purposes may be the subject of some disagreement,52 no one questions that a 
primary aim of the system is to facilitate a fresh start for debtors and serve as a 
superior alternative to state law for satisfying creditors’ claims.53 That being the 
case, having a debt-relief alternative that simultaneously permits debtors to retain 
their property along with some measure of their dignity and includes a repayment 
requirement (a feature absent from chapter 7), which offers creditors an 
opportunity to receive greater payout on their claims than they would pocket in a 
liquidation, makes eminent sense. Put another way, the problem has not been with 
the idea—the problem has been with the execution. 
The question then becomes how to reform chapter 13 to make it attractive 
to more can-pay filers and maximize the likelihood of reaching a successful 
                                                                                                                
committed to payment of unsecured claims. Therefore, the greater the amount of monthly 
payments that must be made to secured claimholders in order to retain possession of the 
collateral, the less the surplus income that will be left for unsecured creditors. See generally 
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2012). 
 51. See supra note 5. 
 52. For the sake of convenience, Professor Baird divides legal scholars into two 
camps. The first group is what he terms the “proceduralists,” who regard bankruptcy as 
more of a minimalist procedural structure and shun the notion that substantive policies and 
rules should inhere in the bankruptcy system separate and apart from state law, except to the 
very limited extent necessary to accommodate a collective proceeding. The other group, the 
“traditionalists,” regards bankruptcy law as playing a special role in our legal system with 
its own substantive bankruptcy goals distinct from state law. Thus, the traditionalists view 
bankruptcy as harboring its own unique distributional policy objectives that are both 
important and distinctive. See Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms, 108 
YALE L.J. 573, 576, 589–90 (1998) (articulating the divide in terms of whether bankruptcy 
is seen as an open or a closed system). These differences are most pronounced in their views 
on business rehabilitation. See Ted Janger, Crystals and Mud in Bankruptcy Law: Judicial 
Competence and Statutory Design, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 559, 566 (2001) (“Broadly speaking, 
the two camps split along two axes. The first division is normative, over whether Congress 
or bankruptcy judges should pursue redistributive goals in the name of ‘bankruptcy policy.’ 
The proceduralists view the sole goal of bankruptcy as generating the highest return for 
creditors, while traditionalists see a role in bankruptcy for protecting groups harmed by 
failure . . . .”). 
 53. That is to say, both traditionalists and proceduralists recognize the role of the 
bankruptcy system as providing a more efficient and equitable system of debt collection. It 
is the role of bankruptcy beyond these core functions where the two camps begin to push in 
different directions, and specifically over the question of preserving ex ante rights and 
effects. See generally Richard M. Hynes, Non-Procrustean Bankruptcy, 2004 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 301, 350–59 (explaining debt relief as a form of social insurance and comparing 
bankruptcy to other social-insurance programs); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 
U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 790–93 (1987). 
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conclusion in a higher percentage of filed cases. That will ultimately require 
legislative judgment or, even better, perhaps the judgment of a special commission 
or agency that might be both more knowledgeable about bankruptcy and less prone 
to bend to the special-interest pressures that have hobbled bankruptcy reform 
efforts in the past.54 In any case, the key is to get off on the right foot; this requires 
that we employ the most advantageous and pragmatic overall conceptualization of 
individual debt adjustment, lest a faulty blueprint lead to construction of yet 
another rickety structure. What follows is one such approach that decision-makers 
might find valuable. It is neither a specific nor a complete proposal for reform. 
Rather, drawing on chapter 13’s intended goals, and bearing in mind the lessons 
from its lackluster performance to date, it is a suggestion for a different way of 
evaluating what is wrong with chapter 13 as it is currently structured and what 
might be helpful in fixing it, assuming the political will to do so exists. 
II. THE SETTLEMENT PARADIGM 
Even after formal proceedings are initiated, most private lawsuits are 
resolved by a voluntary agreement of the parties. In fact, aided by interventions 
such as mandatory, court-ordered mediation, cases settle in such large numbers 
that, in recent years, a fulsome discussion has sprung about the so-called 
“vanishing trial.”55 Settlements, of course, are nothing more than a compact 
between the parties as to how their dispute will finally be resolved. However, they 
are motivated by a complex set of interacting factors that differ from the 
motivations typically accompanying other kinds of consensual bargains, and they 
occur under the threat of a winner-take-all adjudication if settlement negotiations 
fail.56 In addition, if involving a course of performance, they also require 
mechanisms to deal with noncompletion that are more nuanced than the 
conventional remedies for breach of contract.57 What settlements do not entail is an 
                                                                                                                
 54. See Lawrence Ponoroff, Bankruptcy Preferences: Recalcitrant Passengers 
Aboard the Flight from Creditor Equality, 90 AM. BANKR. L.J. 329, 330–34 (2016) 
(discussing the largely polarized and highly politicized nature of bankruptcy reform since 
enactment of the Code). 
 55. The moniker was coined by Professor Marc Galanter. See Marc Galanter, 
The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State 
Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004); see also Marc Galanter, The Hundred-
Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years of War, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1255 (2005); Marc 
Galanter, A World Without Trials, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 7, 23. 
 56. In conventional contract negotiations, either party may walk away without 
liability up until the moment that mutual assent is achieved. In settlement negotiations, there 
is the specter (not to mention the cost and risk) of having the underlying dispute resolved by 
a judge or jury. Logically, this should put more pressure on the parties to find a middle 
ground in settlement negotiations than in other forms of contract negotiation. 
 57. It is important for the party compromising a claim not to inadvertently have 
that claim merged in the settlement agreement such that, if there is a failure to perform, that 
party’s only claim is for the unpaid settlement amount rather than based on the full amount 
of the original claim. This can be accomplished in several ways, including by stipulation to 
judgment for the full claim amount and a covenant not to execute so long as the other party 
performs its obligations under the settlement agreement. See generally Justin A. Harris, 
Note, Judicial Approaches to Stipulated Judgments, Assignments of Rights, and Covenants 
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opportunity for readjustment in the face of changing circumstances, nor could 
they—absent fraud or duress—without wholly undermining the strong public 
policy favoring the private settlement of disputes.58 
Settlements are thus a special species of bargain that, if pressed into 
service as an archetype for structuring reform, could provide greater insight and 
direction than the orthodox apothegm of chapter 13, which postulates a simple 
agreement by the debtor to repay her debts from future income in return for 
retaining her nonexempt property. Of course, in neither case is there a real bargain, 
nor does this Article suggest that chapter 13 be modeled to emulate some 
hypothetical bargain that we imagine the parties would have agreed upon if the 
opportunity for such a negotiation had existed.59 Rather, this Article proposes that 
decision-makers use settlement as the psychological construct to craft a workable 
and effective new chapter 13.60 
For example, consider surplus income—i.e., the result of applying the 
projected disposable income test.61 Is it realistic to assume that a rational defendant 
in a civil suit of plausible, but far-from-certain, merit would be prepared to agree 
to commit all of her future income over and above bare expenses to funding a 
settlement of that lawsuit? Presumably not.62 And yet, that is exactly what the 
                                                                                                                
Not to Execute in Insurance Litigation, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 853, 857–60 (1999). Other 
alternatives might include a dismissal without prejudice, or suspension of the underlying 
suit, so that the right to resume the litigation in the event of the defendant’s failure to 
perform its obligations under the settlement is preserved. 
 58. See generally Margaret Meriwether Cordray, Settlement Agreements and the 
Supreme Court, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 9, 35–41 (1996) (supporting the notion that public policy 
favors private settlement); see also infra note 196 and accompanying text. 
 59. That is the thrust of the standard law and economics account of bankruptcy 
contained in Tom Jackson’s creditors’ bargain model. See Jackson, supra note 15, at 868, 
871 (positing that in an ex ante bargain creditors would negotiate a system that respects the 
efficiencies of nonbankruptcy rights, such as security). For a more contemporary critique of 
the creditors’ bargain model in the context of reorganization, see generally Anthony Casey, 
The Creditors’ Bargain and Option-Preservation Priority in Chapter 11, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 
759, 763 (2011) (arguing that the inherent conflict between senior and junior creditors 
impedes the prospect of maximizing a bankrupt firm’s value). 
 60. From this perspective, BAPCPA, with its emphasis on controlling abuse of 
chapter 7 and eroding many of the advantages for debtors in chapter 13, was a step in the 
wrong direction. See supra text accompanying notes 5, 47–51. The mindset behind 
BAPCPA was not to reach an accommodation between debtor and creditor interests that 
would be palatable to both groups, but to actually decide in favor of one. Moreover, the 
need to means test debtors to avoid misuse by can-pay debtors could arguably be greatly 
reduced, if not outright avoided, by focusing on an invigorated chapter 13 that might 
simultaneously attract eligible debtors and protect critical creditor interests. 
 61. The phrase is intended to refer to the amount of income over and above what 
a debtor requires for expenses. Under the current chapter 13, the debtor is required to devote 
all of her surplus income to plan payments to unsecured creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) 
(2012). 
 62. Of course, there are any number of hypothetical situations where a defendant 
might agree to such an arrangement when settling a claim. But the settlement model 
envisioned in this treatment assumes each party has roughly the same ability of prevailing 
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projected disposable income test in current chapter 13 cases requires.63 Arguably, 
this is a major reason why chapter 13 is so unpopular with debtors, and why plans 
confirmed under its auspices are so often doomed never to reach completion even 
when utilized, voluntarily or involuntarily.64 How the allocation of surplus income 
might be more profitably handled will be discussed later in more detail.65 For now, 
the point is to appreciate the benefits that might flow from examining this and 
related questions from the vantage point of how a debtor would or should likely 
respond if the subject were to be proffered as part of a settlement proposal. 
The situation is more complicated when shifting from the debtor’s 
perspective to that of the debtor’s creditors. As plaintiffs in civil suits, creditors 
rationally would want to see their interests preferred over the interests of other 
plaintiffs. That is effectively the manner in which the state law of creditor 
remedies operates—first come, first served.66 However, the architects of the new 
chapter 13 will have to pay homage to the central bankruptcy policy of equality of 
distribution,67 considering the special in rem rights enjoyed by the holder of 
nonavoidable secured claims in much the same fashion that the current chapter 13 
separately addresses the treatment of secured and unsecured claims.68 This 
indicates that the framework for evaluating the interests of creditors under the 
settlement paradigm should be the distributional norms that underlie chapter 7, 
rather than state debt-collection law.69 That is to say, the terms of settlement must 
                                                                                                                
on the merits and the financial wherewithal to have the claim formally adjudicated if 
necessary. Thus, neither party has a substantive nor a leverage advantage over the other, a 
state of affairs that rarely exists. 
 63. Technically, of course, a debtor cannot be brought into chapter 13 
involuntarily. See supra note 37. However, one of the consequences of BAPCPA is the 
possibility of a de facto involuntary chapter 13. See infra note 64. 
 64. Although there is formally no ability to place a debtor in an involuntary 
chapter 13 under § 303(a), one of the practical consequences of the means test in § 
707(b)(2) is to do precisely that, inasmuch as a debtor who fails the means test will have no 
other feasible bankruptcy alternative. See generally Margaret Howard, Bankruptcy 
Bondage, 2009 U ILL. L. REV. 191, 193–200 (analyzing the 13th Amendment implications of 
BAPCPA in relation to both chapter 13 and, in particular, chapter 11). 
 65. Infra text accompanying notes 110–13. 
 66.  Ponoroff, supra note 54, at 383.  
 67. Equality of distribution is central to bankruptcy policy and summed up in the 
frequently invoked maxim that “equality is equity.” See Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. 342, 346 
(1874) (“It is obviously one of the purposes of the Bankruptcy law, that there should be a 
speedy disposition of the bankrupt’s assets. This is only second in importance to securing 
equality of distribution.”); Frank R. Kennedy, Statutory Liens in Bankruptcy, 39 MINN. L. 
REV. 697, 699–700 (1954) (noting that American bankruptcy law has moved in the direction 
of increasing distributions to unsecured creditors by decreasing the portions that secured 
and priority claimants receive); see also Howard Delivery Serv. v. Zurich Am. Ins., 547 
U.S. 651, 667 (identifying the deep roots of the equality of distribution objective in the 
Bankruptcy Code). 
 68. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1325(a)(4)–(5), (b)(1) (2012) regarding confirmation 
requirements with respect to secured and unsecured claims. 
 69. This is currently reflected in the best interests test of § 1325(a)(4), which this 
Article proposes to modify, as detailed below, in connection with the reconceptualization of 
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be evaluated from the point of view of a collectivized debt-collection proceeding. 
Again, however, the exercise should proceed from the premise of what legislative 
decision-makers determine to be a reasonable accommodation of those collective 
interests and not simply implementation of an agreement mirroring what one 
imagines creditors would form among themselves in a hypothetical ex ante 
negotiation.70 Bearing that baseline parameter in mind, attention can be turned to a 
discussion and analysis of what the contours of a new chapter 13 might look like. 
III. NEW CHAPTER 13 
In this Part, several key aspects of individual debt adjustment proceedings 
will be examined. This examination is undertaken to identify the possible statutory 
revisions that might be called for, and the positions that should prevail with respect 
to key conflicts in the case law, in order to revitalize chapter 13. The topics to be 
sequentially addressed are eligibility, property of the estate, unsecured debt, 
secured debt, modification, discharge, and (the ever popular) miscellany. 
A. Eligibility 
While Congress saw fit to expand eligibility for chapter 13 beyond “wage 
earners,”71 its antecedence in chapter XIII of the 1898 Act was nonetheless evident 
in the decision to restrict the availability of chapter 13 to debtors with limited 
amounts of both secured and unsecured debt.72 Until 2005, debtors whose 
                                                                                                                
chapter 13 as a settlement between a debtor and that debtor’s creditors as a group. See infra 
Section III.C. 
 70. For authorities setting out the economics-based contractarian account of 
bankruptcy, see supra note 15. A major problem with the creditor’s bargain model, focused 
narrowly on the problem of debt collection as the sole aim of the bankruptcy law, is that it 
takes into account only the interests of prepetition creditors. An alternative contractarian 
account, focused on the principles of inclusion and rational planning has been offered by 
Professor Korobkin. See Donald R. Korobkin, Contractarianism and the Normative 
Foundations of Bankruptcy Law, 71 TEX. L. REV. 541, 544–45 (1991) (setting forth what the 
author describes as the “Bankruptcy Choice Model”). This Article’s approach differs from 
either of these approaches because it is not based on what the interested parties, however 
broadly defined, would have agreed to in an ex ante bargain, but what they should agree to 
in order to resolve their conflicting interests. Thus, this Article is not suggesting a new 
contractarian model, but rather a way for decision-makers to think about bankruptcy rules. 
This is because strict contractarian theory, with its emphasis on the good of the individual 
over the good of the community, will never provide real unanimity, even under Jackson’s 
very narrow account of bankruptcy. See Carlson, supra note 16, at 1343–44 (criticizing the 
economic account on this basis). 
 71. See supra text accompanying note 26; see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(e), 101(30) 
(2012). 
 72. As originally enacted, the debt limits for chapter 13 eligibility were $100,000 
in noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts and $350,000 in noncontingent, liquidated, 
secured debts. These ceilings were expanded by § 108(a) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4111-12, to $250,000 and $750,000, respectively. In 
addition, the 1994 amendments added § 104 to the Code under which the amounts in this 
and other sections would be adjusted for inflation without the need for later legislation. The 
Judicial Conference of the United States is empowered to make the adjustment every three 
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obligations exceeded one or both of these thresholds were left with the choice of 
chapter 7 or chapter 11.73 After 2005, some non-chapter-13-eligible debtors may 
be barred from relief under chapter 7 by the “means test” of § 707(b)(2), relegating 
them to chapter 11. At the same time, however, BAPCPA contained a series of 
amendments applying to individual debtors in chapter 11, the cumulative effect of 
which was to eliminate most of the advantages of chapter 11 over chapter 13 for 
such debtors,74 as well as the advantages that non-individual debtors continue to 
enjoy in chapter 11. As a result, chapter 11 is now a rather inhospitable venue for 
individual debtors due to its more cumbersome, costly, and exacting provisions.75 
                                                                                                                
years based on the Consumer Price Index. 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(i) (2008). As of the most 
recent adjustment, April 1, 2016, the amounts were $383,175 and $1,149,525, respectively. 
Revision of Certain Dollar Amounts in the Bankruptcy Code, 81 Fed. Reg. 8748, 8748 (Feb. 
22, 2016). Even with these increases, the existence of these debt ceilings reflects a mindset 
that chapter 13 is only appropriate in relatively small cases, see infra note 74, as well as a 
belief that the absolute priority rule and the creditor franchise are essential protections for 
creditors in business cases. See, e.g., Kenneth Klee, A Brief Rejoinder to Professor LoPucki, 
69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 583, 584 (1995) (questioning the appropriateness of a proposed small 
business chapter that did not have these features). 
 73. The Supreme Court eliminated the prior uncertainty over the eligibility of 
nonbusiness individuals under chapter 11 in Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157 (1991). 
Continued increases in the § 109(e) debt ceilings will ameliorate the frequency with which 
this occurs to some extent. See infra note 74. 
 74. Most of these changes were designed to make chapter 11 operate like chapter 
13 in the case of individual debtors. Thus, among other changes: (1) discharge is now 
delayed until plan completion rather than on confirmation, 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(5)(A) 
(2010); (2) an individual-debtor discharge is subject to all of the § 523(a) exceptions, id. § 
1141(d)(2)–(3) modification may be sought by the trustee or an unsecured creditor, id. § 
1127(e)(4) (2010) postpetition earnings and property become part of the chapter 11 estate, 
id. § 1115(a)(5) (2005), an individual debtor must devote all of her projected disposable 
income to plan payments, id. § 1129(a)(15)(B) (2010). BAPCPA also added an exception to 
the absolute priority rule for property included in the estate under § 1115. See id. 
§1129(B)(2)(b)(ii). This created a split in the case law over the question of whether 
BAPCPA abrogated absolute priority in individual debtor cases. The emerging consensus in 
the courts of appeal, however, is to conclude that the absolute priority rule applies in 
individual cases, including, most recently, the Ninth Circuit. See Zachary v. Cal. Bank & 
Trust Co., 811 F.3d 1191, 1199 (9th Cir. 2016). The court in Zachary reached this view in 
spite of its recognition of the “double whammy” it creates for debtors who now must devote 
disposable income to plan payments, as in chapter 13, but also satisfy absolute priority, a 
requirement absent from chapter 13. Id. 
 75. Along with absolute priority, an individual chapter 11 debtor faces numerous 
other procedures that render chapter 11 more costly and cumbersome than chapter 13, 
including committees of creditors, creditor franchise (and the associated disclosure 
requirements), the requirement of paying all priority claims in full on confirmation, and loss 
of the exclusive right to file a plan. Although in some individual chapter 11 cases, 
economies of scale might well cause creditors to forego or abandon some or even all of 
these rights and protections. See infra text accompanying note 82. See generally Anne 
Lawton, The Individual Chapter 11 Debtor Pre- and Post-BAPCPA, 89 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
455, 482–88 (2015) (demonstrating a sharp drop in the percentage of individual chapter 11 
cases in which a plan was confirmed and completed after BAPCPA). 
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For all intents and purposes, therefore, many of these debtors are left without 
access to any effective form of bankruptcy relief.76 
The debt ceilings on eligibility for chapter 13 reflect a congressional 
judgment that the uncomplicated and straightforward procedures of chapter 13, in 
comparison to chapter 11, should only be available in relatively small-dollar 
cases.77 But why should any individual debtor with regular income be excluded 
from chapter 13? If we think about fashioning a new chapter 13 through the lens of 
a global settlement of extant claims against the debtor, no compelling explanation 
emerges.78 Debtors unquestionably should appreciate the economy and autonomy 
of chapter 13 over a chapter 11 alternative.79 Creditors, while nominally enjoying 
more protections in chapter 11,80 nonetheless should prize the expedition of and 
oversight involved in a chapter 13 case.81 Furthermore, the expanded rights 
afforded to creditors in chapter 11 are unlikely to be invoked in most individual 
cases, except perhaps in the situation where an operating business of some 
                                                                                                                
 76. The 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project found that in 2007, an estimated 
800,000 families that otherwise would have filed prior to BAPCPA did not seek bankruptcy 
protection. See generally Robert M. Lawless et al., Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail? An 
Empirical Study of Consumer Debtors, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349, 351, 375–83 (2008) 
(exploring the implications of the 2007 report). Although the study’s conclusion focused on 
the ineffectiveness of the means test to force high-income debtors to pay a portion of their 
debts, undoubtedly BAPCPA has made bankruptcy a less inviting option, perhaps just as 
intended. Id. at 353; see also James J. White, Abuse Prevention 2005, 71 MO. L. REV. 863, 
874 (2006) (speculating that the goal of BAPCPA was to “degrade the machinery of 
bankruptcy” across the entire income spectrum). 
 77. See Lee, supra note 32, at 304. 
 78. Indeed, the decision in BAPCPA to make individual chapter 11 a kind of 
new “Big” chapter 13 supports this view. See supra note 74; see also Robert J. Landry, III, 
Individual Chapter 11 Reorganizations: Big Problems with the New “Big” Chapter 13, 29 
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 251, 252 (2007). On the other hand, some exclusions may in 
fact be justified because of the existence of alternative regulatory schemes, such as the 
current prohibition on joint chapter 13 cases where the spouse is a stockbroker or 
commodity broker. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (2012). 
 79. Originally, chapter 11 permitted modification of residential home mortgages. 
11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(5) (1978). That ability was eliminated with the revision of                                   
§ 1123(b)(5) as part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394 sec. 206(2), (3) (1994); see also Janet Flaccus, A Potpourri of 
Bankruptcy Changes: 1994 Bankruptcy Amendments, 47 ARK. L. REV. 817, 827–28 (1994). 
 80. See supra note 75. The 2005 amendments relating to individual chapter 11 
cases have likely also operated to reduce a bias on the part of creditors in favor of chapter 
13 over chapter 11. See supra note 74. 
 81. Unlike chapter 11, which can drag out for months or even years, a chapter 13 
debtor must file her plan either with the petition or within 14 days thereof, FED. R. BANKR. 
P. 3015(b), and must begin making payments under the plan even prior to confirmation. See 
11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1) (2012). Moreover, while appointment of a trustee in chapter 11 is 
relatively rare, § 1302(a) ensures that a trustee will be appointed in every chapter 13 case, 
and charged with performing the statutory duties enumerated in § 1302(b). Id. § 1302 (a)–
(b) (2010).  
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magnitude is involved.82 To deal with those relatively rare instances, § 1304 could 
be amended to provide for the appointment of a creditors’ committee on a showing 
of cause83 and possibly to limit to a certain extent the debtor’s exclusive right to 
propose a plan. Otherwise, however, the first crucial step in crafting a new chapter 
13 might be to eliminate the debt limitations in § 109(e) as a vestigial remnant of 
mid-twentieth-century ways of thinking about individual-debt adjustment in 
general, and business bankruptcy in particular.84 
B. Property of the Estate 
The “estate” in a bankruptcy case is governed, by and large, by § 541(a) 
of the Code. It is composed of all property of the debtor as of the commencement 
of the case, along with certain property rights that are acquired by the debtor, or 
the estate itself, after the commencement of the case.85 In addition to this property, 
the estate in a chapter 13 case also includes earnings from services performed by 
the debtor postpetition, but before the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to 
another chapter.86 
Inclusion in the “estate” of earnings or other property acquired by a 
debtor postpetition, however, is not absolute. Upon confirmation, not only is the 
debtor entitled to possess property of the estate under § 1306(b),87 but, pursuant to 
§ 1327(b), the property of the estate is also deemed to vest in the debtor.88 This 
will be the case except where the plan or the order confirming the plan expressly 
calls for a different result.89 Accordingly, unless a provision is made to the 
                                                                                                                
 82. For example, appointment of a creditors committee may be dispensed with, 
id. § 1102(a)(3) (2015), in the case of a small business debtor, which could include an 
individual debtor, id. § 101(51)(D) (2012), and creditors might well determine that 
economies of scale hardly warrant exercising other rights, such as filing a plan once the 
debtor’s exclusivity has expired, id. § 1121 (2012). 
 83. Of course, the standing trustee in such cases is already charged with 
performing the duties specified in § 1106(a)(3)–(4). See id. § 1302(c) (2010). Thus, in most 
cases there would be no need for a committee, even when the debtor is operating a business. 
 84. See Klee, supra note 72, at 584 (questioning the appropriateness even in 
small business cases of depriving creditors of the right to vote and of replacing the 
protection of the absolute priority rule with a disposable income test). This approach to 
chapter 13 would also open up the possibility of eliminating nonbusiness, individual cases 
from chapter 11 entirely, as that chapter was never a very good fit for such filings, just as 
new chapter 13 might eliminate the need to means test debtors in chapter 7, an undertaking 
that cannot be described as a success under almost any reasonable standard of evaluation. 
See Lawless et al., supra note 76, at 352 (observing that the means test did not succeed in its 
avowed goal of only pushing high-income abusers out of the system); see also supra note 
46. 
 85. See 11 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(1) (2012). 
 86. See id. § 1306(a)(2). 
 87. The debtor remains in possession of all property of the estate, except as 
provided in the debtor’s plan or the order confirming the plan. Id. § 1306(b).  
 88.  Id. § 1327(b) (2012).  
 89. See id. (“Except as otherwise provided in the plan or the order confirming 
the plan, the confirmation of a plan vests all property of the estate in the debtor.”). 
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contrary, upon confirmation of a chapter 13 plan, both ownership and control of 
property of the estate, including postpetition wages, belong to the debtor. 
Due to the inherent ambiguity between §§ 1306(a)(2) and 1327(b), courts 
diverge widely regarding what constitutes the “estate” at various points of time in 
the chapter 13 process.90 The Eleventh and Seventh Circuits follow what has been 
dubbed the “estate transformation” rule. Under this approach, while the “estate” 
from the petition date to the date of plan confirmation includes postpetition 
earnings under § 1306(a)(2), at confirmation only the property that is necessary for 
the execution of the plan remains property of the estate.91 
Other courts have adopted the so-called “estate preservation” approach, 
by which all property of the estate postpetition remains property of the estate 
postconfirmation, notwithstanding § 1327(b).92 At the other end of the spectrum, 
other courts have adopted the “estate termination” approach, which, taking a 
textualist approach to § 1327(b), holds that the estate ceases to exist upon 
confirmation, except to the extent the plan or order confirming the plan expressly 
provides otherwise.93 
The import of whether and to what extent property of the estate vests in 
the debtor at confirmation can have significant consequences for both pre- and 
postpetition creditors. For example, if the estate ceases to exist upon confirmation, 
then the automatic stay does not protect postconfirmation earnings because that 
property is no longer property of the estate. This means that postpetition creditors 
may pursue those assets.  This situation operates to the prejudice of prepetition 
creditors, whose only rights are to be paid according to the plan,94 by potentially 
depriving the debtor, and thus the chapter 13 trustee, of the wherewithal from 
which to carry out the terms of the plan. 
                                                                                                                
 90. See generally David Gray Carlson, The Chapter 13 Estate and its 
Discontents, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 233, 233 (2009) (reviewing competing theories 
and defending the “estate transformation” as the most cogent theory); Peter Carpio & 
Jeffrey L. Cohen, Note: Modified Estate Transformation: When Does a Chapter 13 Estate 
Terminate? 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 213, 213 (1999) (explaining three interpretations of 
“property of the estate” and arguing for the most consistent with the spirit of the Code). 
 91. See Telfair v. First Union Mortg. Corp., 216 F.3d 1333, 1339–40 (11th Cir. 
2000); Black v. U.S. Postal Svc. (In re Heath), 115 F.3d 521, 524 (7th Cir. 1997); see also 
Waldron v. Brown (In re Waldron), 536 F.3d 1239, 1242–43 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(distinguishing Telfair and holding that “[n]ew assets that a debtor acquires unexpectedly 
after confirmation by definition do not exist at confirmation and cannot be returned to him 
then.”). 
 92. See, e.g. Aimese v. Kolenda (In re Kolenda), 212 B.R. 851, 853 (Bankr. 
W.D. Mich. 1997). Some districts, such as the Western District of Texas, have gone so far 
as to adopt a standing order to this effect. See In re Scott-Hood, 473 B.R. 133, 135 (Bankr. 
W.D. Tex. 2012). 
 93. See, e.g., Cal. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Jones (In re Jones), 420 B.R. 506, 514–
17 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009); see also Austin, supra note 6, at 1102–03 (identifying at least 
five different approaches to differentiating between property of the estate and property of 
the debtor after confirmation). 
 94. See 11 U.S.C. § 1327(a) (2012). 
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Correspondingly, postconfirmation creditors are treated unfairly if it is 
determined that property of the estate continues to exist after confirmation, since 
they will be barred from collecting on their claims unless and until they are 
successful in obtaining relief from the automatic stay. This is attributable to the 
fact that, while a debt arising after the chapter 13 plan is confirmed can be 
collected against the debtor personally or against the debtor’s property,95 the 
automatic stay prevents action against property of the estate to enforce or collect 
both postpetition and prepetition claims.96 Therefore, the status of property of the 
estate after plan confirmation dramatically affects a postconfirmation creditor’s 
ability to enforce and collect on its claim. Finally, until the promulgation of Rule 
3002.1 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure in 2011 mooted the issue,97 
whether or not the estate revested in the debtor upon confirmation had an 
enormous impact on lenders seeking to collect postconfirmation fees and costs 
from mortgagors who had confirmed a cure-and-maintenance plan under 
§ 1322(b)(5)98—a fact that ultimately led to profuse litigation, including multiple 
class action lawsuits against mortgage lenders and servicers.99 
Proceeding from the outlook of chapter 13 as a global settlement of 
claims against the debtor, a resolution of this disagreement over what constitutes 
property of the estate quickly becomes apparent. If all of the debtor’s 
postconfirmation property remains property of the estate, the debtor is not free to 
alienate assets without court permission; a trip to the gas station must be preceded 
by a trip to the courthouse. On the other hand, if the estate ceases to exist at 
confirmation, it puts prepetition creditors’ prospects of being paid in accordance 
with the plan in jeopardy. This also puts at risk the likelihood of the debtor 
eventually receiving a discharge. Thus, neither the estate-preservation nor estate-
                                                                                                                
 95. Such collection activity is barred only when it is based on a claim against the 
debtor arising prior to the commencement of the case. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2010).  
 96. See id. §§ 362(a)(2)–(3). The stay remains in effect against property of the 
estate until such property is no longer property of the estate. Id. § 362(c)(1).  
 97. At the heart of the dispute was the assertion that a lender seeking to collect 
postconfirmation fees or costs from its mortgagee was required to file an application for 
such amounts and obtain court approval under the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. 
Compare Padilla v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 389 B.R. 409, 442–43 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2008) 
(holding that Rule 2016 only applies to a creditor seeking to collect legal fees from the 
estate), with Padilla v. Wells Fargo, 379 B.R. 643, 654–55 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2007) (holding 
that Rule 2016 is not limited to entities seeking compensation for expenses incurred on 
behalf of the estate, but also applies to oversecured mortgage lenders). 
 98. Section 506(b) is inapplicable to plans utilizing Code § 1322(b)(5) because § 
1322(e), adopted in 1994, states that “[n]otwithstanding . . . section[ ] 506(b) . . . of this 
title, if it is proposed in a plan to cure a default, the amount necessary to cure the default 
shall be determined in accordance with the underlying agreement and applicable 
nonbankruptcy law.” (emphasis added). 11 U.S.C. § 1322(e) (2012); see, e.g., Patterson v. 
Homecomings Fin., LLC (In re Patterson), 444 B.R. 564, 569 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2011). 
 99. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 695 F.3d 360 (5th 
Cir. 2012). See generally S. Andrew Jurs, What Banks Need to Know About Attorney’s Fees 
in Chapter 13 Proofs of Claim, 120 BANKING L.J. 623, 623 (2003) (noting that, as of the 
time of publication, at least five class actions had been filed in the bankruptcy court for the 
Western District of North Carolina alone). 
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termination approach is a palatable alternative from the vantage point of the 
affected parties. The logical middle ground—which is, after all, the idealized norm 
of any settlement—is estate transformation.100 Moreover, to the extent we expand 
the bargaining table to include postpetition creditors, the case for estate 
transformation becomes even more compelling. Specifically, the self-interested 
bias of that cohort would naturally be in favor of estate termination—a position 
irreconcilably at odds with the preferences of the debtor and prepetition creditors. 
Viewed, however, from the mindset of the settlement construct, postpetition 
creditors not entitled to distributions under the plan and facing the risk that estate 
preservation could prevail should rationally settle for estate transformation as a 
reasonable modus vivendi. 
C. Unsecured Debt 
Originally, the interests of unsecured creditors in chapter 13 were 
protected solely by the best interests test of § 1325(a)(4). That test requires that, as 
a condition to confirmation of a plan, unsecured creditors receive, in present-value 
terms, at least as much as they would have received in a hypothetical liquidation of 
the debtor under chapter 7.101 While the protections for unsecured creditors were, 
on paper, much more robust in chapter 11, as a practical matter these added 
protections provided little succor in the typical individual-consumer case.102 The 
situation, however, where unsecured creditors felt exploited was when the debtor 
had few unencumbered, nonexempt assets as of the time of filing—meaning a very 
minimal or even zero payment plan would satisfy the best interests test—but had 
significant prospective income.103 
Congress listened and responded by adding a second confirmation 
standard relating to unsecured debt: the projected disposable income test in 
§ 1325(b). Under this test, the debtor must apply all surplus income—i.e., gross 
income over reasonably necessary living expenses—during the life of a plan to the 
                                                                                                                
 100. See Carlson, supra note 90, at 235–37 (presenting a doctrinal justification for 
the estate transformation approach, which he dubs the “Divestment Theory,” based on the 
view that the Code, properly read, calls for termination of the chapter 13 estate in favor of 
the debtor). 
 101. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (2012). Of course, a debtor might often have to pay 
more than this floor in order to accomplish what the debtor wants to accomplish in the plan. 
This could be due to the need to cure prepetition defaults in order to retain property that the 
debtor wants to retain, the necessity of paying priority claims in full; or perhaps to pay a 
nonpriority nondischargheable debt (such as student loans) in order to avoid facing 
collection actions upon the end of the chapter 13 case.  See id. § 1322(b)(2)–(5) (2012) 
(permitting separate classification of like claims subject to the “unfair discrimination” 
standard). 
 102. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 103. Initially, creditors also raised charges of foul play in circumstances where the 
debtor was discharging debt in chapter 13 that would be nondischargeable in chapter 7. 
There is, however, not much left to the superdischarge. See supra note 36 and 
accompanying text; infra Section III.F. In both instances, good faith served as something of 
a limitation, but its application was inconsistent and, thus, certainly not predictable. 
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payment of unsecured claims.104 The best interests and projected disposable 
income tests purport to work in tandem because the former reels in a debtor with 
significant assets but meager prospective income, while the latter covers the 
opposite scenario.105 In fact, however, what these tests really do is make chapter 13 
so onerous as to discourage its use and assure low rates of completion, a situation 
that benefits no one. 
In designing chapter 13 in the 1970s, Congress sought to lure debtors to 
its environs by dangling delectable carrots.106 As discussed earlier,107 the effort did 
not achieve its desired effect, but not because the concept was faulty. Congress had 
the right idea; there were just some flaws in the application. Notably, however, just 
six years after enactment of the Code, Congress began drifting off-script insofar as 
chapter 13 was concerned, making it less attractive to prospective filers. That 
pattern continued over the next 20 years, culminating in BAPCPA.108 By gradually 
abandoning the promising idea of inducing debtors to elect chapter 13 and, instead, 
heading in the direction of forcing them into chapter 13 by making other 
alternatives less palatable or simply unavailable,109 Congress has converted chapter 
13 from a kind of Eden to a chaotic purgatory. Not surprisingly, therefore, it has 
neither met with any meaningful success in invigorating repayment over 
liquidation nor has it advanced particularly well the interests of any of the parties 
involved in a bankruptcy case.110 
This suggests that there is little to be lost by reforming chapter 13 using 
the settlement analogy as a guiding or structuring principle. Insofar as unsecured 
creditors are concerned, while the best interests test alone may not represent a fair 
treatment consistent with the Code’s objectives of value-maximization and 
equality, adoption of the projected disposable income test tilts the table way too far 
in the other direction. Moreover, the amendments to the projected disposable 
                                                                                                                
 104. Technically, imposition of the projected disposable income test is not 
triggered unless the chapter 13 trustee or an unsecured creditor with an allowed claim 
objects to confirmation. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1) (2012). As a practical matter, however, 
such an objection is invariably forthcoming if the plan does not propose to pay unsecured 
claims in full. 
 105. Thus, in terms of prototype situations, the projected disposable income test 
snags the soon-to-be professional-school graduate with few assets but a high-paying job in 
the wings, while the best interests test ensures that the imminent retiree with considerable 
assets cannot confirm a plan applying only future income to plan payments. In fact, 
however, because projected income for purposes of the disposable income test is, since 
2005, governed by the definition of “current monthly income,” id. § 101(10A), projected 
and actual income could diverge significantly. See infra note 112. Prior to BAPCPA, 
disposable income was defined as “income which is received by the debtor and which is not 
reasonably necessary to be expended” for the debtor’s support, maintenance, charitable 
contributions, and business expenses. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2)(A) (2003). 
 106. See supra text accompanying notes 25–35. 
 107. See supra text accompanying notes 37–39. 
 108. See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 135–41 and 
accompanying text. 
 109. Supra notes 37–40. 
 110.  See supra note 5. 
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income test for above-median debtors under BAPCPA have only exacerbated the 
situation.111 Is it any wonder that debtors do not brighten at the prospect of living 
for three or five years in a condition of involuntary financial servitude? If, 
however, the settlement model is brought to bear, a middle ground might be found 
that could be acceptable to both camps. 
To begin the discussion, serious attention should be given to jettisoning 
the projected disposable income test in its entirety. A collateral but immediate 
benefit of doing so would be to put an end to the uncertainty, and consequent 
litigation, surrounding its proper interpretation and application.112 More to the 
point, however, it would make chapter 13 far less grueling for debtors and, along 
with the recommendations concerning plan modification discussed below,113 
would eliminate the disincentives that the current chapter 13 imposes on debtors 
working to improve their post-bankruptcy financial lot.114 But, undoubtedly, 
                                                                                                                
 111. To begin with, in the case of above-median income debtors, BAPCPA not 
only extended the “commitment period” to five years, but it also provided that reasonably 
necessary expenses would be determined in accordance with subparagraphs (A) and (B) of § 
707(b)(2). See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(A)–(B) (2012). That is to say, they would be determined 
according to the means test formula with all of the arbitrariness and uncertainties associated 
with calculation of the statutorily permitted deductions. 
 112. The question of whether the debtor’s projected income must be determined 
based on the debtor’s income over the six months prior to filing—per § 101(10A)—even 
when actual income during the plan period was known with virtual certainty to differ 
considerably from the formulaic projection, was settled by the Supreme Court. See 
Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S. 505, 524 (2010). However, a myriad of other unresolved 
interpretative questions remain in situations where the above-median debtor’s actual 
expenses are different than the means test expenses. For instance, in Ransom v. FIA Card 
Servs., N.A., the Court held that a debtor who owned his car free and clear could not claim 
the vehicle ownership expense deduction in § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii), which incorporates the IRS 
Collection Standards. 562 U.S. 61, 80 (2011). However, it is not clear that Ransom 
precludes a debtor who actually has monthly ownership deductions from claiming the full 
IRS-recognized deduction amount, regardless of her actual ownership expense. Id. at 84 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Similarly, it is not clear whether a debtor who incurs the actual 
monthly expense, but has no legal liability, can claim the deduction. See In re Demonica, 
345 B.R. 895, 901 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006) (holding that a deduction is permitted based on 
equating “applicable” with “actual” for purposes of § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)). Finally, there is a 
lack of clarity as to whether a debtor can deduct payments on secured debts under § 
707(b)(2)(A)(iii) if the debtor intends to surrender the collateral. Compare Morese v. Rudler 
(In re Rudler), 576 F.3d 37, 45–50 (1st Cir. 2009) (noting that the thrust of the means test is 
to take a snapshot of the debtor’s expenses and apply the formula objectively), with Darrohn 
v. Hildebrand (In re Darrohn), 615 F.3d 470, 476 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying the reasoning of 
Lanning to conclude that an adjustment to permitted expenses should be made where it is 
known that the debtor plans to surrender the collateral). 
 113. See infra Section III.E. 
 114. A major flaw in the current system is that debtors are not given a positive 
incentive to improve their financial situation when the fruit of their labors goes solely (or 
primarily) to payment of prepetition debt. See generally John E. Matejkovic & Keith 
Rucinski, Bankruptcy “Reform”: The 21st Century’s Debtors’ Prison, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. 
L. REV. 473, 484 (2004) (noting that chapter 13 requires debtors to commit all disposable 
income to creditors for at least three to five years). 
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unsecured creditors would balk at this settlement.  And well they should, both for 
some of the reasons that accounted for adoption of a projected disposable income 
test to begin with, and also because chapter 13 would offer them greater risk with 
virtually no promise of a better outcome than in chapter 7. For this reason, a proper 
settlement would include, along with elimination of the projected disposable 
income test, modification of the best interests test to require that unsecured 
creditors be assured of receiving not just as much under the plan as they would 
have received in a liquidation, but more—up to, but not beyond a 100% payout. 
How much more? This is a decision for Congress, hopefully informed by data and 
the view of interested constituents. However, it seems that anything less than 
110% is too little, and anything more than 125% is too much, but again, in either 
case, capped by the total amount of the debt.115 
There are surely other means to achieve this same end, including leaving 
the best interests test as is and modifying the projected disposable income test so 
that there is a ratable sharing of surplus income between the debtor and her 
unsecured creditors.116 Alternatively, the obligation to share surplus income might 
only be triggered for debtors above a certain income level in much the same 
fashion that the method for determining allowable expenses for purposes of the 
projected disposable income test is tied to applicable annual median income.117 
Again, how that allocation should be struck is an open question for legislative 
decision-makers. There is a myriad of possibilities; the point is to reach consensus 
on a fair arrangement that lessens the burden (and the consequent crippling impact) 
of the projected disposable income test while still providing creditors protection 
against misuse of the system by debtors with significant prospective income and 
relatively modest distributable assets. 
                                                                                                                
 115. Thus, if the plan calls for payment of 90% of unsecured claims and the new 
best interests standard is 115%, allowed unsecured claims would be entitled to 100 cents on 
the dollar, and not 103.5 cents. However, consideration might even be given to providing 
postpetition interest in the event payout reaches 100% prior to reaching the enhanced best 
interests threshold. 
 116. See Braucher, supra note 5, at 1324–27 (discussing the approaches in Canada 
and Australia, both of which provide for the debtor to keep a portion of income in excess of 
reasonable expenses). For additional explanation of the Canadian experience, see Jacob 
Ziegel, What Can the United States Learn from the Canadian Means Testing System?, 2007 
U. ILL. L. REV. 195, a general discussion of the differences between the U.S., Canadian, 
Australian, and English systems can be found in Nathalie Martin, Common-Law Bankruptcy 
Systems: Similarities and Differences, 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 367 (2003). 
 117. See supra note 112. Nonetheless, without rejecting any such hybrid approach 
out-of-hand, the author of this Article believes the cleaner approach—at least in terms of 
administrative ease—would be the single, beefed-up best interests test, which 
simultaneously promises unsecured creditors the likelihood of a larger payout than under 
chapter 7 and creates positive incentives for debtors to choose chapter 13 and be successful 
when they did so. 
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D. Secured Claims 
No single constituency in chapter 13 has fared quite as well in post-1978 
statutory reforms as the holders of secured claims.118 As originally enacted, chapter 
13 provided debtors with three options for dealing with secured debt in their plans. 
Under § 1325(a)(5)(A), they could (1) do whatever they please if the secured 
creditor agreed; (2) surrender the collateral to the creditor in satisfaction of the 
secured claim;119 or, the most commonly chosen option, (3) retain the collateral 
subject to the lien and provide for payment in the plan to the secured creditor of an 
amount that is not less than the present value, as of the effective date of the plan, 
of the allowed amount of the secured claim.120 The third option—cram down—was 
(and remains) an attractive one for debtors. It effectively allows the debtor to do an 
installment redemption of the collateral,121 and to do so under terms that might be 
more favorable than the terms of the original debt obligation insofar as the interest 
rate and maturity of the obligation are concerned.122 The one major exception to 
the debtor’s ability to cram down a secured claim that has always existed relates to 
residential real property mortgages. Under § 1322(b)(2), the debtor may not 
modify the rights of the holder of a claim secured only by a security interest on the 
debtor’s principal residence.123 Even as to these claims, however, the debtor can 
reinstate a loan that had been accelerated due to a pre-bankruptcy default by 
proposing to cure the default under the plan.124 
Due to the fact that chapter 13 effectively permits the debtor to re-write 
the original prepetition obligation forming the basis of the secured claim, two 
questions arise: 1) how the principal amount of this new obligation is to be 
determined; and 2) what rate of interest it should bear to make it equivalent to a 
lump-sum payment. The Supreme Court has addressed both issues. In Associates 
                                                                                                                
 118. See infra notes 140–45 and accompanying text. 
 119. A partially secured creditor would of course retain its unsecured claim in the 
case of surrender. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2005).  
 120. See id. § 1325(a)(5)(A)–(C) (2012). 
 121. Under chapter 7, redemption requires an immediate, lump-sum cash 
payment. See id. § 722 (2005). Under chapter 13, repayment can extend for the entire term 
of the plan; up to five years. See id. § 1322(a)(4) (2012). 
 122. This includes paying only for the value of the collateral, possibly at a lower 
interest rate than called for by the instrument creating the original obligation, and over a 
term that might exceed the original term of the debt. See infra notes 133–35 and 
accompanying text. 
 123. Supposedly, the reasoning for this favored treatment of residential mortgages 
is to encourage the flow of capital into the home-lending market and to protect the integrity 
of the capital markets for home mortgage loans. See Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 
324, 332 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also infra note 152. 
 124. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(5) (2012). Courts have consistently construed                        
§ 1325 (b)(5) as not limited by the ban in § 1322(b)(2) against modifying home mortgages. 
See, e.g., Di Pierro v. Taddeo (In re Taddeo), 685 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982); see also infra 
note 183. Note that an exception to the anti-modification rule in § 1322(b)(2) applies in the 
relatively rare situation where final payment under the terms of the mortgage is due prior to 
the end of the term of the plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(2) (2012). 
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Commercial Corp. v. Rash,125 the Court held that a “replacement value” standard, 
not a “foreclosure sale” standard,126 was the correct way to value personal property 
collateral retained by a chapter 13 debtor. However, the Court left to the 
bankruptcy courts the issue of how to measure replacement value, noting that if 
retail value were used as the starting point it would be appropriate to deduct “the 
value of items the debtor does not receive when he retains” collateral, “items such 
as warranties, inventory storage and reconditioning.”127 The latitude to take 
account of such factors was largely eliminated in 2005 by the addition of § 
506(a)(2), which directs the court in individual chapter 7 and 13 cases to use retail 
value with respect to personal property collateral, taking into account the age and 
condition of the property, but without deduction of the retailer’s profit or costs 
from retail price.128 
As for determination of the interest rate—i.e., the discount rate for present 
value purposes—to be applied to plan payments, a deeply divided Supreme Court 
in Till v. SCS Credit Corp.129 adopted the formula method (also called “prime 
plus”).130 This requires the bankruptcy court to start with prime rate of interest—
what banks charge their most reliable, creditworthy customers—and then add a 
suitable premium to take account of the added risk associated with the debtor’s 
situation.131 The Till approach, although commanding the approval of only four 
Justices, remains the governing standard, and, far more often than not, it will be 
more favorable than the “presumptive contract” rate approach advocated by the 
four dissenting Justices in Till.132 
                                                                                                                
 125. 520 U.S. 953 (1997). 
 126. Foreclosure sale value—what the creditor would realize upon foreclosure 
and sale of the collateral—is also referred to as “wholesale value.” This was the standard 
the court of appeals adopted in In re Rash 90 F.3d 1036, 1061 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), 
rev’d sub nom. Assoc. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953 (1997). 
 127. This language comes from the famous footnote six in Rash. See 520 U.S. at 
965 n.6. It opened the door for the bankruptcy courts, while starting with replacement value, 
to back into wholesale value. See David Gray Carlson, Cars and Homes in Chapter 13 After 
the 2005 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, 14 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 301, 359 
(2006) (positing that this “loophole” largely left the bankruptcy courts to ignore Rash 
entirely and just do what they had always done insofar as valuation was concerned). 
 128.  See generally In re Morales, 387 B.R. 36, 41–42 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2008) 
(discussing the change accomplished under BAPCPA with respect to the determination of 
replacement value in individual consumer cases in chapters 7 and 13). 
 129. 541 U.S. 465 (2004). 
 130. Justice Stevens’s opinion, which carried the day, was a plurality opinion. As 
Professor Tabb has pointed out, when one considers the various voting alliances, a majority 
of the Justices rejected every one of the approaches that had been proposed for determining 
the applicate interest rate. See CHARLES JORDAN TABB, LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 1252 (3d ed. 
2013). Because Justice Thomas believed that the prime rate alone was appropriate, he 
concurred with the Stevens opinion because prime plus would sufficiently compensate the 
lender in the case. See Till, 541 U.S. at 486–88 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 131. See Till, 541 U.S. at 471, 479–80. 
 132. See id. at 491 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The presumptive contract rate, which 
had been adopted in the Seventh Circuit majority opinion, In re Till 301 F.3d 583, 592–93 
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Although not addressing the discount rate to be employed in chapter 13 
cases, BAPCPA has otherwise accelerated the lopsided leaning toward preserving 
the contractual rights of secured creditors in chapter 13,133 as evinced by the 
above-mentioned valuation rules in § 506(a)(2). In addition, the 2005 amendments 
to chapter 13 prohibited stripping down most vehicle (and some other) purchase 
money loans;134 provided for recovery of costs, charges, and fees in favor of over-
secured-statutory lienors;135 eliminated chapter 13 property valuations on 
conversion to chapter 7;136 and required that, in the cram-down scenario, chapter 
13 plan payments not only be at least equal to the present value of allowed secured 
claims, but also be made in equal installments and in an amount sufficient to 
provide adequate protection to the holders of such claims.137 The cumulative effect 
of these changes has been to make it more difficult to confirm and complete a 
chapter 13 plan. Moreover, even when a debtor is able to do so, these new 
advantages flowing to secured creditors largely come at the expense of their 
unsecured counterparts.138 
                                                                                                                
(7th Cir. 2002), is essentially the original contract rate, but open to adjustment upon proof 
by the debtor or the creditor that either a higher or a lower rate is warranted. Id. at 472. 
 133. By definition, an insolvency situation is a zero-sum game. See supra note 50. 
Thus, provisions in BAPCPA that provide greater protection for secured claims must come 
at the expense of unsecured creditors. Id. An exception to this statement might have been 
the provision that disables bifurcation under § 506(a)(1) as to certain secured claims in 
chapter 13, see 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(C); (a)(9) (2012); infra note 137, where the debtor 
elects to surrender the collateral. However, now that the weight of authority in the appellate 
courts is that the unsecured claim persists where the debtor surrenders, rather than retains 
the collateral, even that small exception has been desiccated. See, e.g., In re Wright, 492 
F.3d 829, 832 (2007) (holding bifurcation may still occur under state law when the 
collateral is surrendered to the secured creditor). 
 134. This prohibition against strip down of certain (mostly motor vehicle) liens in 
chapter 13 is contained in what is famously referred to as the “hanging paragraph” 
following § 1325(a)(5). See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a). For an excellent treatment of secured 
claims after the 2005 amendments, see Jean Braucher, Rash and Ride-Through Redux: The 
Terms for Holding on to Cars, Homes and Other Collateral Under the 2005 Act, 13 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 457 (2005). 
 135. This was accomplished by adding the language “or State statute under which 
such claim arose” to the end of 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (2005), and, in so doing, partially 
overruling the Supreme Court’s decision in Ron Pair Enters., Inc. v. United States. See 489 
U.S. 225, 248–449 (1989) (denying a chapter 11 plan on the ground that it did not contain 
provisions for payment postpetition interest on an over-secured tax lien). 
 136. Codified as 11 U.S.C. § 348(f)(1)(C) (2010). 
 137. Codified as 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(iii)(II) (2012); see infra text 
accompanying notes 158–62. 
 138. Payments on secured debt are generally reductions from current monthly 
income, see, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2012), and thus reduce disposable income 
available for distribution to unsecured claimants. See supra note 52. This becomes less of a 
concern, of course, if the projected disposable-income-requirement for plan confirmation is 
eliminated as suggested above. See supra text accompanying notes 115–118. If, however, 
the determination is made to allocate disposable income between the debtor and unsecured 
creditors, see supra text accompanying note 116, then it remains an issue. 
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A settlement-model-driven approach would require rethinking the 
treatment of secured claims under chapter 13. As a threshold matter, it is necessary 
to reach a shared understanding of what it means to be “secured” in a bankruptcy 
case, and unfortunately, that seemingly simple topic is one that has generated sharp 
disagreement.139 We should, however, revert to the traditional bankruptcy 
conception of the term as codified in § 506(a)(1); namely that secured creditors 
with allowed claims are entitled to the value of their collateral and nothing 
more.140 However, as amply demonstrated by the amount of litigation it generates, 
as well as Code provisions, such as § 1111(b),141 valuation is not an exact science, 
to say the least, and concern over the accuracy of valuations is perhaps the 
principal concern of secured creditors in bankruptcy cases.142 Therefore, in light of 
the concessions that the new chapter 13 will require of the holders of secured 
claims, this Article proposes that § 506(a)(2) be retained, even though it clearly 
results in an overvaluation of consumer collateral in most situations, because the 
debtor does not receive the benefit of the marketing and sales costs that can no 
longer be deducted.143 The thought, however, is to err on the side of caution insofar 
                                                                                                                
 139. See generally Daniel Keating, Radlax Revisited: A Routine Case of Statutory 
Interpretation or a Sub Rosa Preservation of Bankruptcy Law’s Great Compromise, 20 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 465, 468–69 (2012) (discussing the Supreme Court’s reluctance to 
impinge upon a secured creditor’s state-law rights and remedies except when necessary to 
accomplish a compelling bankruptcy purpose); Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen 
Knippenberg, The Immovable Object Versus the Irresistible Force: Rethinking the 
Relationship Between Secured Credit and Bankruptcy Policy, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2234, 
2263–73 (1997) (criticizing the so-called “conveyancing model” of security). 
 140. This is clearly the view that drove the Supreme Court’s decisions in Johnson 
v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 88 (1991) (upholding the ability to modify a secured 
creditor’s claim in Chapter 20) and United Savings Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest 
Assocs., Inc. (In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates), 484 U.S. 365, 382 (1988) 
(denying a secured lender adequate protection for its lost opportunity costs). However, not 
long afterwards, beginning with Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 410 (1992) (holding that 
chapter 7 debtor could not “strip down” creditors’ liens on real property to a judicially 
determined value of collateral), the Court began demonstrating ambivalence on the issue 
and a greater solicitude for the state-law-contractual rights of secured creditors. 
 141. The right of a secured creditor to have its claim treated as fully secured 
(forego any unsecured claim under § 506(a)(1)) is a product of secured lenders’ concerns 
about artificially low judicial valuations. Indeed, the provision has its origins in a notorious 
case under the 1898 Act, In re Pine Gate Assocs., Ltd., 2 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1478 
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1976), in which a dissenting nonrecourse-secured creditor was cashed out 
at what was regarded as an unrealistically low price. See generally Theodore Eisenberg, The 
Undersecured Creditor in Reorganizations and the Nature of Security, 38 VAND. L. REV. 
931, 955–57 (1985). 
 142. Eisenberg, supra note 141, at 948. 
 143. See TABB, supra note 130, at 738 (asserting that to describe the value 
produced by § 506(a)(2) as anything “other than a windfall to the creditor would be 
disingenuous.”); see also Braucher, supra note 134, at 467 (pointing out that while former § 
506(a) could flexibly make use of any available proof, new paragraph § 506(a)(2) inflexibly 
seems to call for a retail merchant’s price that, as a practical matter, is nonexistent). There is 
less risk of overcompensation with real estate, although there are certainly issues like selling 
costs and taxes. Thus, while § 506(a)(2) does not cover real-property collateral, the logic is 
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as assuring secured creditors that their legitimate property interests will be 
protected. Conceptually, it is in the nature of a settlement for each side to make 
some concessions. Moreover, a reasonable balance between creditor rights and 
debtor protection and rehabilitation is necessary if new chapter 13 is to have any 
realistic chance of enactment, and, once enacted, is to remain free from constant 
backsliding.144 
With regard to the discount rate to be utilized in chapter 13, what is good 
for the goose must also be good for the gander. Thus, this Article proposes that the 
Till test be left in place (or codified) even though it probably does systematically 
undercompensate creditors as Justice Scalia stated in his Till dissent.145 The 
justification for doing so, beyond just tit-for-tat, is that it nominally provides a 
risk-adjusted market return to the secured creditor during the life of the plan, even 
if the reality is that the cost of proving the proper adjustment in any given case 
makes it hardly worth the effort.146 On the other hand, as the plurality opinion in 
Till noted, the justification for starting low and working upward is that it is 
invariably creditors who have greater access to market information.147  
                                                                                                                
probably to apply it analogically as, again, erring on the side of the protection of the value 
of the creditor’s interest in property.  
 144. See Ponoroff, supra note 54, at 331–32 (opining that much of the history of 
bankruptcy reform legislation since 1978 is explicable in terms of efforts by the financial 
services industry and credit providers to claw back what they regarded as the undeserved 
and disproportionate advantages conferred on debtors). 
 145. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 491–92 (2004) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); see also Jon W. Jordan, Note, No More Russian Roulette: Chapter 13 “Cram 
Down” Creditors Take a Bullet, 70 MO. L. REV. 1385, 1398–1406 (agreeing with Scalia’s 
dissent). 
 146. Under the plurality opinion, in every case where the creditor disagrees with 
the prime rate as the cram-down rate and the parties cannot agree on a risk premium, a 
hearing will be necessary at which the debtor and any creditors may present evidence about 
the appropriate risk adjustment. Till, 541 U.S. at 466. This is hardly cost-effective in most 
cases, meaning that, as the party with the burden of proof, there will be some pressure on 
creditors to simply agree to a “standard” bump. See Robert K. Rasmussen, Creating a 
Calamity, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 319, 331 (2007) (“The rate endorsed by Justice Stevens would 
imply that the average [c]hapter 13 debtor presents the same risk as does the Ford Motor 
Company . . . [and that] . . . [a] bump of one to three percent over the prime rate falls 
woefully short of compensating this risk. Justice Stevens’s opinion simply cannot be 
squared with commercial reality.”); cf. April E. Knight, Balancing the Till: Finding the 
Appropriate Cram Down Rate in Bankruptcy Reorganizations after Till v. SCS Credit 
Corporation, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1015, 1029 (2005) (pointing out that the necessity of a hearing 
also places a burden on a debtor whose funds would be better used for the plan). 
 147. The plurality opinion in Till noted this factor in justifying “starting from a 
concededly low estimate and adjusting upward” in order to place the evidentiary burden 
squarely on the creditors. 541 U.S. at 479. In point of fact, the plurality noted that the 
prime-plus and presumptive contract rate should produce the same final interest rate, so that 
the real question was over who has the burden of proof. Id. at 484. The dissent recognized 
that this assertion was a bit of hyperbole, observing the 1.5% plus over prime (8%) that the 
bankruptcy court had applied could not plausibly be viewed as “anything other than a 
smallish number picked out of a hat.” Id. at 501. Given that the contract was 21%, it is hard 
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In addition, the secured creditor is typically better situated in terms of 
resources to make its case if it so chooses, while placing the burden on the debtor 
would just further deplete assets available for distribution to unsecured claimants. 
Further, an approach that most often will produce a lower rate of interest than the 
presumptive contract rate favored by the Till dissent increases the odds that a 
debtor will be able to confirm her plan.148 The fact that a new chapter 13 assures 
the secured creditor the full value—retail cost—of its secured claim, and more 
than the dollar value on its unsecured claim (if any), should be enough to make the 
settlement model acceptable, even if the risk premium on the new secured claim 
ends up being somewhat less than what might have been charged outside 
bankruptcy.149 
Beyond preserving the Rash and Till rules, a certain number of the 
BAPCPA amendments to chapter 13—hardly drafted to begin with in the spirit of 
compromise and even-handedness150—would likely need to be eliminated, 
including, principally, the hanging paragraph and the added restrictions on cram 
down.151 At least some thought ought also be given to permitting modification of 
residential-home-mortgage loans to the extent the property is underwater, a 
phenomenon that we all learned in 2008 is not as uncommon as had earlier been 
thought.152 Keeping one’s house and car are the most common reasons debtors 
                                                                                                                
to argue that point, although some haircut in order to enhance the prospects of plan 
completion, is not an unreasonable trade-off. 
 148. See 541 U.S. at 480 (expressing the view that the interest rate calculation 
should be set high enough to compensate the creditor, “but not so high as to doom the 
plan.”). 
 149. Of course, there really is no market to consider, because very little used 
consumer collateral is sold by retail merchants. See Braucher, supra note 134, at 467. 
 150. No one seriously disputes that BAPCPA was anything other than a credit-
industry-driven effort to restrict bankruptcy relief for consumer debtors. See generally 
Jensen, supra note 3, at 485–93 (detailing the legislation’s history going back to its original 
antecedents in the dissent to the NBRC Report). In their multi-volume treatise, former 
Judges Lundin and Brown note, “A handful of lobbyists working for a coalition of 
consumer lenders wrote BAPCPA in the dark of smoke-filled rooms and back alleyways.” 
KEITH M. LUNDIN & WILLIAM H. BROWN, CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCY §360.1 (4th ed. 2007), 
www.Ch13online.com. 
 151. See supra notes 133–34 and accompanying text.  
 152. In the wake of the real estate meltdown beginning in 2008, both houses of 
Congress introduced legislation to permit modification of home mortgages, but ultimately 
nothing came of these efforts. See Helping Families Save Their Homes Act, H.R. 1106, 
111th Cong. (2009); see also S. 895, 111th Cong. (2009); S. Amend. 1014 to S. 896, 111th 
Cong. (2009), reprinted in 155 CONG. REC. S4980–84 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2009) (setting out 
text of Senator Durbin’s amendment to Senate Bill 896, for himself and for Senators Dodd, 
Reid, Schumer, Whitehouse, and Harkin). Ultimately, the Durbin amendment was 
withdrawn after failing to achieve the required votes. An intellectual justification for 
permitting home mortgage modifications can be found in Adam J. Levitin, Resolving the 
Foreclosure Crisis: Modification of Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 2009 WISC. L. REV. 565, 
575–76 (arguing that “empirical evidence from mortgage origination, insurance, and resale 
markets to show that mortgage markets are indifferent to bankruptcy-modification risk.”). 
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consider chapter 13. The current system, which makes the cost of doing so 
prohibitive for many debtors, needs to be shaken up. 
One palliative for those lenders absorbing the reduction in the amount 
needed for the debtor to retain possession of a house or car is that the bifurcated 
unsecured portions of their claims would enjoy the bonus that the new chapter 13 
would add to the best interests test.153 Of course, elimination of the projected 
disposable income test would mean that, prospectively, the savings resulting from 
bifurcation would flow to the debtor rather than to unsecured claimants. However, 
it is not entirely clear that, as a practical matter, this has not always been the case 
to some extent.154 If so, the pumped-up best interests test is, in all likelihood, of 
greater value to partially secured creditors than the arguable loss of future income 
that would have been enjoyed under the disposable income requirement. 
Alternatively, this situation might suggest that some form of allocation of 
disposable income between the debtor and her unsecured creditors is the more 
prudent approach.155 In any case, the point is that these changes would make 
chapter 13 more attractive to prospective debtors, as well as more effective. 
Further, they would do so, while not only assuring creditors of protection of their 
property interests, but also of a larger payout than they would have received in the 
event of liquidation. This strikes the kind of reasonable settlement worth thinking 
about. 
Finally, serious deliberation ought to be given to the elimination of 
§ 1325(a)(5)(B)(iii), which, as a condition to the other requirements for cramming 
down a secured claim, dictates that if the plan calls for deferred payments (as they 
invariably do), they must be made in equal installments, and, in the case of 
personal-property collateral, that the payments be sufficient to provide the 
claimholder adequate protection during the duration of the plan.156 The first 
stipulation is of lesser significance than the latter, but it does hamper the prospects 
for confirmation in a case involving a debtor who: (a) experiences seasonal 
adjustments in income; (b) needs or wants to pay off certain obligations quicker 
than others; or, for some other benign reason, (c) wishes to make unequal 
payments.157 
The requirement that plan payments assure adequate protection on car and 
other personal property loans is more problematic. To begin with, it is arguably in 
                                                                                                                
 153. See supra text accompanying note 17–20. 
 154. Given the inherent flexibility in the phrase “reasonably necessary” under      
§ 1325(b)(2), it is inevitable that income freed up from lien stripping would incline the 
bankruptcy court to accept somewhat larger deductions for “necessaries” and perhaps even 
a broader definition of the categories of expenses that represent necessaries for purposes of 
the projected disposable income test. Cf. In re Woodman, 287 B.R. 589, 592–93 (Bankr. D. 
Me. 2003) (“There are fundamental problems with branding one kind of expenditure or 
another as ‘never’ reasonably necessary. . . . Better to consult each case’s unique facts and 
circumstances, to consider each [c]hapter 13 plan on its individual merits, than to attempt a 
generalized declaration.”). 
 155. See supra notes 117, 141 and accompanying text. 
 156.   11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(iii) (2012). 
 157. See LUNDIN & BROWN, supra note 150, § 448.1. 
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conflict with the simultaneously adopted requirement that plan payments be made 
in equal installments.158 It also subverts the principal advantage of chapter 13 for 
most debtors; namely, the ability to strip down secured loans to the collateral’s 
value, or at least to do so in those remaining situations where strip down is not 
prohibited by statute.159 The combination of those restrictions operates to rob 
chapter 13 of its appeal to many soon-to-be debtors. The obvious concern behind 
the adequate-protection requirement was to ensure that payments keep pace with 
asset depreciation.160 That concern, however, would be ameliorated to a 
considerable extent by eliminating modification to surrender, as described 
immediately below.161 Thus, on balance, the cost of the adequate-protection 
stipulation to the system may reflect too high of a price to pay in those remaining 
situations where it might quiet a secured claimant’s reasonable insecurity over 
receiving the value of its collateral.162 
E. Modification 
Due to the strong policy favoring finality in chapter 13 and in bankruptcy 
cases in general,163 entry of an order of confirmation is widely understood as 
                                                                                                                
 158. Id. One line of cases deals with this conflict by concluding that the 
requirement for equal installments applies only to actual cram-down payments (payments 
on the amortized debt) and not adequate-protection payments. See, e.g., In re DeSardi, 340 
B.R. 790, 805–08 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006). Other courts have disagreed with that creative 
reading of the statute, concluding instead that the reference in § 1325(a)(5)(B)(iii)(I) that 
“such payments shall be in equal monthly amounts” means that all regularly recurring post-
confirmation payments on an allowed secured claim must be in equal monthly amounts. 
See, e.g., Royals v. Massey (In re Denton), 370 B.R. 441, 445–46 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2007). 
 159.  See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(b)(2), 1325(a)(5) (2012). 
 160. In re Nichols, 440 F.3d 850, 857 n.6 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he new language 
seems to require that payments made after confirmation be in equal amounts and keep pace 
with depreciation during the term of the plan.”). 
 161. See infra Section III.E. 
 162. Moreover, since 2005, it is clear that if the case is converted, valuations 
made in the chapter 13 case no longer apply and the lender retains its lien until the full 
amount owed on the debt (not just the value of the collateral) has been fully paid. See 11 
U.S.C. §§ 348(f)(1)(B)–(C) (2010). 
 163. See generally Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 644 (1992) (relying 
on the importance of the policy of finality in bankruptcy cases to support the holding that 
the failure of a chapter 7 trustee to object to the validity of a debtor’s claimed exemption 
within 30 days of the initial creditors’ meeting renders the property exempt, regardless of 
whether the debtor had a colorable basis for claiming the exemption). The policy is also 
expressed when the equitable mootness doctrine is used to consider appeals of an order 
confirming chapter 11 plans. E.g., Deutsche Bank AG v. Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc. 
(In re Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc.), 416 F.3d 136, 143–44 (2d Cir. 2005). And in the 
statutory mootness provision that applies to bankruptcy sales. E.g., Clear Channel Outdoor, 
Inc. v. Knupfer (In re PW, LLC), 391 B.R. 25, 33–34 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008) (pointing to      
§ 363(m) and principles of equitable mootness as precluding appeal of sale of debtor’s 
assets). 
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affording preclusive effect with respect to all preconfirmation claims.164 The 
confirmation order, however, does not denote the end of the chapter 13 case—not 
by a long shot. Under § 1329(a), a confirmed plan may be modified for any one or 
more of four reasons, including increasing or decreasing payments to be made 
under the plan.165 Unlike in the case of a preconfirmation modification,166 the 
debtor is not the only one who can seek approval of a proposed modification after 
confirmation. The chapter 13 trustee or any unsecured creditor may also petition 
the court for postconfirmation plan modification.167 When the debtor seeks 
modification, most often it is because she has encountered difficulties in making or 
keeping up with plan payments; indeed, a debtor who seeks a hardship discharge 
without first making an effort to modify the plan will be required under 
§ 1328(b)(3) to demonstrate that modification was not practicable.168 When the 
chapter 13 trustee or an unsecured creditor requests modification, the reason will 
usually be to seek an increase in payout due to an improvement in the debtor’s 
financial fortunes. 
There is a wealth of issues surrounding modification in chapter 13 that, in 
spite of extensive litigation, remain unresolved. For example, as illustrated below, 
courts have clashed over what showing is sufficient to warrant granting the relief 
sought. This is a product of the fact that the statute does not supply a “cause” 
requirement or, for that matter, any other standard for modification.169 
Nevertheless, courts seem to exhibit more deference to debtor-initiated requests 
than they do to requests coming from an unsecured creditor or the trustee.170 In a 
                                                                                                                
 164. 11 U.S.C. § 1327(a) (2012) (“The provisions of a confirmed plan bind the 
debtor and each creditor, whether or not the claim of such creditor is provided for by the 
plan.”); see also United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 261 (2010) 
(unanimously affirming that a creditor with adequate notice cannot collaterally attack the 
confirmation order in a chapter 13 case, once entered, despite procedural errors committed 
by the bankruptcy court). 
 165. Modification may also be sought to: (1) extend or reduce the payment period 
to a particular class; (2) alter the distribution to a creditor to take account of sums received 
from other sources; and (3) reduce amount to be paid by the amount spent by the debtor to 
purchase health insurance for herself and dependents.  11 U.S.C. § 1329(a)(2)–(4) (2012). 
 166. Only the debtor can modify a filed plan prior to confirmation. See id.            
§ 1323(a). 
 167. This was accomplished by an amendment to § 1329(a) in connection with the 
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 
333, 357. 
 168.  See, e.g., In re Harrison, No. 96-36511-T, 1999 WL 33114273, at *2 (Bankr. 
E.D. Va. Aug. 3, 1999) (holding that a hardship discharge cannot be granted under any 
approach where the debtor fails to offer any evidence to show that plan modification is not 
possible). 
 169.  11 U.S.C. § 1329(a). 
 170. See, e.g., United States v. Evans (In re Evans), 77 B.R. 457, 459–60 (Bankr. 
E.D. Pa. 1987) (holding that a debtor is permitted to modify the plan after confirmation 
notwithstanding absence of extraordinary postconfirmation circumstances); In re Gronski, 
86 B.R. 432, 432 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (observing that “power of a debtor to request 
postconfirmation amendments is much broader than that of a creditor”). But see In re 
Palmer, 419 B.R. 162, 165–66 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2009) (denying debtor’s request for 
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nondebtor-initiated modification situation, traditionally, most courts have agreed 
that the movant must demonstrate changed circumstances.171 This makes sense in 
light of the res judicata effect on the order of confirmation.172 Nonetheless, there is 
no consensus among these courts as to whether the change in circumstances must 
have been just substantial, or both substantial and unanticipated.173 Further 
complicating the picture, yet another view, and one that has been gaining traction, 
is that no proof of change of circumstances is required at all for a nondebtor 
modification.174 
                                                                                                                
modification absent a showing of a material change in circumstances not reasonably 
anticipated at the time of confirmation); In re Bereolos, 126 B.R. 313, 325 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ind. 1990) (“Res Judicata is a two-edged sword, and to the extent the confirmation order is 
binding on both the Debtor and the creditors it is res judicata as to both.”). 
 171. See Storey v. Pees (In re Storey), 392 B.R. 266, 272 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2008) 
(observing that even though there is no changed circumstances precondition to 
modification, § 1327(a) can be read to preclude modification of a confirmed plan for 
purposes of addressing issues that were or could have been decided at the time the plan was 
originally confirmed). The practical impact of this conclusion is that modification under       
§ 1329(a) would be limited to matters that arise postconfirmation. 
 172. See supra note 164. 
 173. See, e.g., Murphy v. O’Donnell (In re Murphy), 474 F.3d 143, 149 (4th Cir. 
2007) (“[T]he doctrine of res judicata prevents modification of a confirmed plan pursuant to 
§§ 1329(a)(1) or (a)(2) unless the party seeking modification demonstrates that the debtor 
experienced a ‘substantial’ and ‘unanticipated’ post-confirmation change in his financial 
condition.” (citing Arnold v. Weast (In re Arnold), 869 F.2d 240, 243 (4th Cir. 1989))); 
Arnold, 869 F.2d at 241 (“[I]t is well settled that a substantial change in the debtor’s 
financial condition after confirmation may warrant a change in the level of payments.”); In 
re Savilonis, No. 3:12-bk-5762-JAF, 2014 WL 3361986, at *3 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. July 9, 
2014) (holding that the debtor must demonstrate substantial, unanticipated change in 
circumstances in order to modify plan payments); In re Brice, No. 11-36393-KRH, 2013 
WL 5701050 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Oct. 18, 2013); In re White, 411 B.R. 268, 275 (Bankr. 
W.D.N.C. 2008) (“[T]he debtor must have experienced a substantial and unanticipated 
change in his post-confirmation financial condition in order to avoid the preclusive effect of 
the doctrine of res judicata.”); In re Furgeson, 263 B.R. 28, 36 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2001) (“A 
trustee’s application for plan modification should be limited to situations in which there has 
been a substantial change in the debtor’s income or expenses that was not anticipated at the 
time of the confirmation hearing.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 174. See, e.g., Barbosa v. Solomon, 235 F.3d 31, 41 (1st Cir. 2000) (relying on 
legislative history to support the argument that substantial change is not a requirement for 
modification and that res judicata does not apply); In re Witkowski, 16 F.3d 739, 743 (7th 
Cir. 1994) (“[N]either § 1329 nor the doctrine of res judicata impose [sic] any threshold 
change in circumstances standard.”); In re Scarver, 555 B.R. 822, 828–32 (Bankr. M.D. 
Ala. 2016) (agreeing with line of authorities holding that demonstration of an unforeseen 
substantial change in debtor’s circumstances is not a prerequisite for modification of a 
confirmed chapter 13 plan); In re Salpietro, 492 B.R. 630, 636 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(holding that a substantial, unanticipated change in circumstances is not required to support 
modification of a confirmed plan); In re Davis, 404 B.R. 183, 187–88 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 
2009) (holding that under Meza v. Truman (In re Meza), 467 F.3d 874 (5th Cir. 2006), 
neither unanticipated nor substantial changes in circumstances are a necessary prerequisite 
to modification of a confirmed plan). 
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Modification has also spurred what one court has described as “one of the 
great debates in [c]hapter 13 law,”175 and a sharp divide in the decisional law. The 
question is whether a debtor may modify her plan in order to surrender collateral 
that the plan had originally contemplated would be retained by the debtor under     
§ 1325(a)(5)(B). As noted earlier, surrender is an explicit option for the debtor in 
connection with confirmation.176 However, modification to surrender—as opposed 
to increase or decrease payments—is not an option under § 1329(a). Therefore, 
some courts hold that modification is simply not available for the purpose of 
surrendering the collateral in satisfaction of the secured claim.177 The leading 
decision—and only circuit court authority—comes from the Sixth Circuit,178 which 
observed that § 1329(a) by its terms is limited to modification of only the amount 
or timing of payment.179 In addition, as a matter of policy, the court reasoned that 
it would be fundamentally unfair to allow a debtor who had promised to pay for 
the value of a vehicle in a chapter 13 plan to subsequently return that vehicle to the 
lender in a situation where the decline in value due to depreciation exceeded the 
amount by which the secured claim had been amortized thus far under the plan.180 
Other courts, certainly representing a majority, hold that there is no per se 
bar against a modification to permit surrender of collateral, although most require 
that the modified plan treat any resulting deficiency as an unsecured claim; in 
effect, bifurcating the claim a second time.181 It is of no small import that, by far, 
                                                                                                                
 175. In re Jones, 538 B.R. 844, 847 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 2015). 
 176. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 177. See, e.g., In re Royal, No. 14-07134-5, 2016 WL 2568861, at *2 (Bankr. 
E.D. N. C. 2016) (holding that § 1329(a) does not permit a modification that would allow a 
debtor to surrender collateral and convert the remaining deficiency to an unsecured claim); 
In re Arguin, 345 B.R. 876 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006); In re Coffman, 271 B.R. 492 (Bankr. 
N.D. Tex. 2002); In re Jackson, 280 B.R. 703 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2001). The court in Jones 
rejected a per se prohibition on modifications to surrender, but denied the debtor’s motion 
nonetheless based on the lack of a showing of a change in circumstances. Jones, 538 B.R. at 
852–53. In so doing, the court distinguished an earlier decision in the same district, In re 
Wilcox, 295 B.R. 155 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 2003), on the basis that the debtor in Wilcox 
proposed to surrender in full satisfaction of the secured claim; i.e., the creditor did not 
propose to treat the deficiency as an unsecured claim. Jones, 538 B.R. at 848.  
 178. Chrysler Fin. Corp. v. Nolan, 232 F.3d 528 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 179. Id. at 533. 
 180. Id. (noting that the proposed modification also contravened § 1327(a)). 
 181. See Jones, 538 B.R. at 849 (citing cases that contemplate this type of 
modification); see also In re Scarver, 555 B.R. 822, 828–32 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2016) 
(accepting what the court describes as the “majority view” permitting modification and 
bifurcation). See generally Stacia M. Stokes, Comment, Fighting Finality and Debtor Waste 
in Chapter 13 Postconfirmation Collateral Surrender, 27 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 169, 192 
(2010) (proposing modification to surrender collateral be permitted unless the depreciation 
in the value of the collateral is due to debtor waste). A number of cases have circumvented 
the requirements of § 1329(a) by looking to § 502(j), which provides that “[a] claim that has 
been allowed or disallowed may be reconsidered for cause.” 11 U.S.C. § 502(j) (2012). 
According to the reasoning in these decisions, when collateral is surrendered after 
confirmation, the debtor may use § 502(j) to reduce a secured creditor’s previously allowed 
secured claim to equal the amount of the surrendered collateral and reclassify the remainder 
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most of these cases involve motor vehicles. When other types of collateral are 
involved, the situation becomes more complicated. The point, and the depth of the 
complexity, is ably illustrated by Judge Jernigan’s decision in In re Ramos.182 That 
case was unusual in two respects: first, the collateral at issue was the debtors’ 
principal residence, and second, the debtors had made all of the payments to the 
chapter 13 trustee contemplated under the 60-month plan prior to seeking 
modification, but they had not made all of the direct payments to the mortgagee 
that were to be made outside of the plan.183 Initially, the court rejected the debtors’ 
argument that they were entitled to a discharge under § 1328(a) based on having 
completed “all payments under the plan.”184 Anticipating that determination, the 
debtors then urged that modification, for the purpose of surrendering the collateral, 
was still permissible because, under § 1329(a), modification must occur before 
completion of payments under the plan.185 
While acknowledging that such an end-of-case modification might be 
allowed, so long as it does not involve extending payments beyond five years after 
the first payment made under a confirmed plan,186 the court ultimately followed the 
line of cases holding that modification for the purposes of surrender is not 
authorized by § 1329(a).187 Judge Jernigan admitted that the fact that the collateral 
was a residence rather than a vehicle gave the case greater “equitable appeal” than 
the usual modification to surrender case, but decided that the fact that this form of 
collateral is far less likely to depreciate during the case than an automobile should 
not matter if the issue is decided solely based on the language of the Code.188 
Notably, however, the court narrowly limited the precedential scope of its holding 
to the unusual facts of the case; in dicta, it explained that the outcome could well 
be different in the much more common situation where the lender takes affirmative 
action by moving for relief from the stay and beginning foreclosure, and the debtor 
                                                                                                                
of the claim as an unsecured deficiency under § 506(a). See, e.g., In re Boykin, 428 B.R. 
662, 667 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2009); In re Sellers, 409 B.R. 820, 824 (Bankr. W.D. La. 2009). 
 182. 540 B.R. 580 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2015). 
 183. Id. at 582. The debtor had confirmed a “cure-and-maintain” plan under § 
1322(b)(5) with respect to the mortgage. Typically, this entails the curing of a prepetition 
default through payments under the plan and the maintenance of regular payments to the 
mortgagee while the case is pending outside of the plan. See generally In re Thompson, 520 
B.R. 731, 735–36 (Bankr. E.D. Wisc. 2014). 
 184. Ramos 540 B.R. at 588 (concluding that direct payments to a mortgage 
lender during the case constitute “payments under the plan” for purposes of § 1328(a)). 
 185. Id. at 584 (referring to the determination that the debtors had not completed 
the plan payments as representing a “good news/bad news” scenario). 
 186. Id. at 590 (finding that because the debtors’ proposed modification was 
simply to surrender collateral and not to extend the commitment period, the modification 
would not have violated the limitation in § 1329(c)). 
 187. Id. at 590–91. 
 188. Id. at 584. Adding to the equities in the case was the fact that the mortgagor 
never complained nor took any action in response to the debtors’ postconfirmation default 
in the mortgage payments. Id. 
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is also not at the end of the plan such that there is no way to deal with the lender’s 
anticipated deficiency as an unsecured claim.189 
When those two conditions are present, the court mused that the surrender 
could be justified under § 1329(a)(3), because the “modification” would really just 
be taking account of the lender’s receipt of consideration other than under the 
plan.190 In addition, when, as in Ramos, the collateral consists of the debtor’s 
homestead, the court observed that it is necessary to take into account                   
§§ 1322(b)(2) and (b)(5), which prohibit modification of the rights of a home 
mortgage lender in a chapter 13 plan. Thus, the court cautioned that, even when 
modification to surrender might be permitted under § 1329(a)(3), the mortgage 
lender must not be prevented from protecting its unsecured deficiency claim after 
stay relief and foreclosure, lest its rights have been altered in contravention of the 
Code’s anti-modification provisions.191 This statement seems to imply that, in a 
case where the collateral is not the debtor’s homestead, surrender in full 
satisfaction of the amount of the original secured claim might be permitted, 
although one cannot be entirely clear based on the language of the decision. 
In any event, the court’s thoughtful opinion in Ramos makes it quite 
apparent that the modification cases are a mess, and, in the modification to 
surrender situation, the solution is not as simple as choosing one of two opposing 
views.192 Employing his bargain model of chapter 13,193 which regards 
postconfirmation disposable income as belonging to creditors for the duration of 
the plan, Professor Carlson concluded that re-bifurcation of a secured claim upon 
surrender of collateral violates the bargain and should be disallowed.194 Thus, he 
concurs with the Nolan view, although he points out the irony of the fact that the 
same practical result might result when the obligation is being paid outside the 
plan.195 
Looking at modification through the settlement conceptualization of 
chapter 13, a somewhat broader conclusion might well be reached. That is to say, 
not only would modification to surrender not be permitted, but modification for 
any reason, other than to take account of payments received by a creditor not 
                                                                                                                
 189. Id. at 585. 
 190. Id. at 595–96 (contrasting this situation from the situation where the debtor is 
forcing a change on the creditor midway through the plan.). 
 191. Id. at 585–86. 
 192. The positions taken in the cases seem to range from a per se ban on 
modifications to surrender; to modification in complete satisfaction of the secured claim; to 
modification with re-classification of the deficiency; to modification based on a balancing 
of the unfairness to the debtor, the secured creditor, and unsecured creditors of permitting 
modification vel non.  
 193. See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text. 
 194. Carlson, supra note 9 at 649–51 (arguing that modification should be limited 
to lowering or raising payments to the chapter 13 trustee as disposable income rises or falls, 
and should not be used to change the amount of the secured claim or the unsecured deficit). 
 195. Id. at 652–54 (observing that when the debtor is paying the lender outside the 
plan the debtor can simply stop making payments even if modification to surrender is 
denied). 
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under the plan would be eliminated as well. The logic follows from the criticality 
of the concept of finality to the private settlement of disputes. Settlement brings 
closure to the uncertainty, as well as the cost, of the ongoing litigation of a dispute. 
Invariably, time will bring greater clarity to that uncertainty, but it would be an 
unmitigated disaster if we were to permit either the party who subsequent 
developments reveal paid too much, or the party who received too little, to re-open 
negotiations.196 Moreover, occasionally a party will settle a claim for less than 
what it believes to be its appraised worth because of the defendant’s financial 
condition or its own cash needs. A subsequent, unexpected change in either party’s 
financial fortunes do not make that settlement any less final than one where the 
discovery or development of new facts reveal that the claim was better or worse 
than how the parties assayed it at the time of settlement. 
The articulated rationale supporting modification in chapter 13 is that 
circumstances may change during the life of the plan and the parties ought to be 
able to seek adjustment based on such changes.197 That explanation is not 
compelling. First, the same could certainly be true in chapter 11, but the Code 
prohibits modification once the plan has been substantially consummated.198 
Second, the ability to obtain modification based on changed circumstances 
imaginatively treats chapter 13 like an alimony or child-support order.199 But 
importing the policies and considerations that animate domestic-relations 
proceedings into the commercial realm makes little sense and is wholly 
inconsistent with the finality and certainty objectives that underlie the bankruptcy 
system. That rationale does, however, indirectly reveal another problem with 
current chapter 13 cases: they last too long.200 Thus, a return to a default three-year 
term, with possible extension to no more than five years only for cause shown, 
would be a healthy step as well in revitalizing chapter 13.201 
The point is that, if the debtor purchases the winning Powerball ticket two 
weeks after plan confirmation, then fortuity ought to make no difference in terms 
of the rights of prepetition creditors, assuming the plan met all of the requirements 
                                                                                                                
 196. This is basically the logic behind recognizing the good faith relinquishment 
of a claim as consideration for the settlement payment, even if it is later determined that the 
claim was specious. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 74 (1981). 
 197. Meza v. Truman (In re Meza), 467 F.3d 874, 877 (5th Cir. 2006) 
(“Modification is based on the premise that, during the life of the plan, circumstances may 
change, and parties should have the ability to modify the plan accordingly.”) (citing In re 
Taylor, 215 B.R. 882, 883 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1997)). 
 198. See 11 U.S.C. § 1127(b) (2010). 
 199. It is quite common, of course, for alimony and support orders to be modified 
based on a change of circumstances. This makes perfect sense where the purpose of the 
original order was to repair any unfair economic effects caused by a divorce and to assure 
that a child’s expenses are shared equitably between the custodial and noncustodial parent. 
Thus, these orders implicate important social and personal issues that simply do not arise in 
connection with marketplace transactions, where considerations such as certainty and 
finality loom large. 
 200. This was recognized in the 1970s as being a factor accounting for the relative 
unpopularity of chapter XIII. See supra text accompanying note 27. 
 201. See supra note 45. 
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for confirmation.202 Under current chapter 13, it is projected disposable income 
that is to be applied to plan payments, not actual disposable income. Thus, even if 
new chapter 13 provided for some type of sharing of surplus income, that fact 
alone would not conceptually insist that any portion of that this newfound wealth 
be applied to prepetition debts. Moreover, improvement in the debtor’s financial 
condition is far more often to likely be the result of the debtor’s own efforts than it 
is to be due to an unanticipated windfall. As noted earlier,203 ideally, new chapter 
13 would more closely align economic incentives with socially desirable behavior, 
and surely a debtor is far more likely to put forth the effort to improve her financial 
fortunes and well-being if she knows she will not have to wait several years to be 
the beneficiary, at least in part, of the fruits of that effort. 
By the same token, the fact that the debtor experiences a financial setback 
should not serve as grounds to excuse a breach under the plan—other than perhaps 
for a very limited period of time.204 This may seem harsh, but the debtor must be 
expected to maintain her end of the deal no less than her creditors. So it is if a 
defendant in a civil suit is unable to meet the terms of a well-constructed 
settlement agreement that calls for installment payments of the stipulated sum: the 
original claim is reinstated and the proceedings continue, or judgment execution 
proceeds.205 Undoubtedly, such an unforgiving response to misfortune not of the 
debtor’s own making could have a chilling impact on the goal of encouraging the 
use of chapter 13 over chapter 7. Thus, in designing the new chapter 13, 
consideration should be given not only to reducing the maximum plan duration, 
but also to liberalizing the rules for a hardship discharge, as discussed in the 
Section that follows.206 This is far easier to rationalize, not to mention more 
equitable, when it is borne in mind that the new chapter 13 also requires unsecured 
creditors to come out better than they would have had the debtor chosen to 
liquidate instead.207 
There are a couple of caveats and limitations regarding this 
recommendation for a sharp reduction in the scope of postconfirmation 
modification. First, an exception should exist in the event of fraud, and, in fact, 
one already does so in the form of § 330.208 Second, the grounds for revocation in 
§ 330 might be amended to include noncompliance with the good-faith 
requirement of § 1325(a)(3) based on facts not coming to light until after 
                                                                                                                
 202. This treatment is consistent with 11 U.S.C. §§ 348(f)(1)(A), (2) (2010), 
which, upon conversion, exclude postpetition property, except where the conversion was 
undertaken by the debtor in bad faith. 
 203. See supra text accompanying note 116. 
 204. To discourage a debtor who cannot make the required plan payments from 
dismissing the case prematurely, it might make sense to soften the rule to allow a grace 
period and right to cure for some number of months. 
 205. This assumes of course the settlement was structured properly so that the 
original claim would not be merged into the settlement agreements. See supra note 57. 
 206. See infra Section III.F.2. A limited right to cure and reinstate a plan would 
also lessen the harshness and ill effects of this rule. See supra note 183. 
 207. See supra text accompanying note 115. 
 208.  11 U.S.C. § 330 (2012).  
40 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 59:1 
confirmation.209 This would respond to concerns over gamesmanship, not rising to 
the level of fraud, by debtors seeking to take advantage of their right to retain 
income in excess of what would be required to make plan payments. For example, 
a debtor who, with knowledge that she is likely soon to be the beneficiary of a 
favorable adjustment in income, files solely in order to protect such income from 
creditors might be vulnerable to revocation of the confirmation order.210 Third, a 
perhaps less draconian solution would be to follow the pattern in the chapter 11 
realm and permit modification, but only up until some designated point in time 
after confirmation.211 While not outright rejecting such an approach, however, it is 
important to note that elimination of the disorder and dysfunction surrounding 
application of the current rules governing modification makes a strong case for 
simply taking the “no modification” route. Finally, it bears reiterating that an 
ability to modify when a creditor receives payment from another source would 
need to be retained under any circumstances.212 
F. Discharge 
1. Full-Payment Discharge 
As originally designed, the discharge granted to a chapter 13 debtor at the 
completion of plan payments included several categories of debt that are 
nondischargeable in a chapter 7 case.213 This so-called “superdischarge” was one 
of the key components in Congress’s plan to cajole debtors to elect repayment 
under chapter 13 in lieu of liquidation under chapter 7. There is no question that 
this decision was controversial and held the potential to produce some unsavory 
results.214 On the other hand, as the adage goes, it is hard to whip up an omelet 
without breaking a few eggs. 
                                                                                                                
 209.  See id. §1325(a)(3) (2012). 
 210. This is the same concern discussed in the adoption of the projected 
disposable income. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. If the manipulation is 
discovered prior to confirmation, an adequate remedy already exists in both the good-faith-
filing requirement (§ 1325(a)(7)) and the requirement that the plan be proposed in good 
faith (§ 1325(a)(3)). 
 211. Supra note 204. If such an approach were to be adopted, the cutoff would 
need to be imposed somewhat earlier than “substantial completion.” 
 212. The surrender of collateral is effectively an asset payment, rather than truly a 
modification, that needs to be deducted from the value of the secured claim. See In re 
Ramos, 540 B.R. 580, 595–96 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2015); supra text accompanying notes 
194–95. 
 213. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 214. The most notorious of these was Handeen v. LeMaire (In Re LeMaire), 883 
F.2d 1373, 1375 (8th Cir. 1989), a case in which the debt arose out of a civil judgment 
against the debtor who had shot Handeen five times—a fairly clear instance of a debt that 
would be excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6). In an en banc decision, the majority of 
the Eighth Circuit concluded that the debtor’s plan could not be confirmed based on bad 
faith, although there was a dissenting opinion that, in essence, lamented the majority 
opinion as another example of the Holemsian adage that “hard cases make bad law.” Id. at 
1382 (questioning how it could be “bad faith” to do precisely what the statute 
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Initially, in situations where the facts of the case were particularly 
egregious, or the debtor was proposing a zero- or nominal-payment plan, 
opponents urged courts,215 with some modicum of success, to circumvent the 
superdischarge by denying confirmation based on the good faith requirement of     
§ 1325(a)(3).216 Next, Congress began nibbling away at the scope of the 
superdischarge in 1990217 and finished the job in 2005, so that now there is no 
longer any material difference between the full-payment discharge in chapter 13 
and the chapter 7 discharge, although a couple of carve outs remain.218 In addition, 
BAPCPA added § 1328(f) to the Code, which denies discharge if the debtor 
received a discharge in a prior chapter 7, 11, or 12 case within four years of filing 
the current chapter 13 case, even when all of the other conditions in chapter 13 are 
satisfied.219 Finally, consistent with its emphasis on, and faith in, financial 
education, BAPCPA also included a provision denying discharge to a debtor who 
fails to comply with the requirement to complete a personal-financial-management 
course.220 
The bottom line is that the discharge no longer plays an important role in 
connection with chapter choice. Whether it should or not is a difficult question as 
some of the cases where a more robust discharge would apply can be unsettling.221 
                                                                                                                
unambiguously permitted). The case that really accounted for the demise of the 
superdischarge was Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 
552, 563 (1980) (holding that a criminal restitution obligation was, in fact, a debt and, as 
such, dischargeable in chapter 13). 
 215. Adoption of the projected disposable income test largely eliminated 
challenges based on zero- or minimal payment plans because it ensured that unsecured 
creditors were wringing every cent out of the debtor beyond what the debtor needed to 
survive. See supra text accompanying note 105. If the projected disposable income test is 
modified as proposed herein, and certainly were it to be eliminated entirely, good faith 
challenges on this basis might be resurrected. 
 216. Prior to 1984, some courts took the view that a zero-payment plan was a per 
se violation of the good faith requirement. At the other end of the spectrum, some courts 
have rejected the amount to be paid under the plan as a relevant factor at all in the good 
faith analysis. Not surprisingly, many courts take the middle ground. See generally John T. 
Kelly, “Good Faith” Analysis Under Chapter 13—The Totality of the Circumstances 
Approach: Handeen v. Lemaire, 23 CREIGHTON L. REV. 573 (1990). 
 217. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 218. The only debts not dischargeable in chapter 7 that may still be discharged in 
chapter 13 are as follows: (1) certain tax debts under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(A) (2012); (2) 
noncriminal fines and penalties covered by § 523(a)(7); and (3) debts arising out of property 
settlements in connection with domestic relation cases, § 523(a)(15). 
 219. The prohibition is two years if the discharge in the earlier case was a chapter 
13 discharge. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(f)(2) (2005). If the second filing is a chapter 7 case,      
§ 727(a)(9) controls, which allows for denial of discharge if a chapter 13 case was 
commenced within six years of the new case—subject to exception if certain payout 
benchmarks were achieved in the earlier case. 
 220. See § 1328(g)(1). Probably not an unreasonable requirement, assuming an 
adequate number of reputable and high-quality courses are available. The instructional 
course must be approved under 11 U.S.C. § 111(a)(2) (2010). 
 221. See supra note 202 and accompanying text. 
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It is also not clear what the rationale is for making just particular creditors—those 
whose claims would be discharged in a chapter 13 but not under chapter 7—bear 
the burden of a public policy favoring chapter 13. Thus, under the guise of a 
settlement model—bearing in mind that it must be approached from the 
perspective of proceeding in which all claims have been aggregated for 
adjudication—a more felicitous middle ground is needed. Perhaps the kinds of 
debt typically owing to governmental authorities, most notably taxes, ought to 
remain fully dischargeable, as this spreads the cost of Congress’s choice to favor 
chapter 13 broadly across society. As for private debt, as in any equitable 
settlement, an answer might be to allocate the loss resulting from the portion of the 
debt not paid under the revised best interests test between the debtor and the 
creditor holding the § 523(a) nondischargeable claim. This scheme should also 
include the three categories of private debt that currently remain fully 
dischargeable in chapter 13,222 because, as a general proposition, the distinctions 
historically drawn between the § 523(a) debts that would be part of the 
superdischarge and those that would not have always been somewhat arbitrary. 
Legislators would need to sort out the precise portion of § 523(a) debts 
provided for in the plan that should remain nondischargeable. However, bearing in 
mind that the revised best interests test assures such claimholders of a better 
payout than they would have received in a hypothetical liquidation, it occurs to me 
that at least 50% of the unpaid balance should be nondischargeable if and when the 
debtor completes the plan. It is of course possible that Congress might decide that, 
as a matter of public policy, one or more categories of § 523(a) are simply too 
important to include within this new superdischarge. The caution to be sounded 
about permitting such carveouts is that this can quickly become a slippery slope, as 
the history of bankruptcy reform since 1978 has witnessed in the expansion over 
time in the number of exceptions to several Code rules,223 including the § 523(a) 
categories themselves.224 At some point, even if no single exception is itself 
objectionable, the sum total of exceptions takes a toll on the effectiveness of that 
rule, and the bankruptcy purpose it is intended to serve, which exceeds the weight 
of the individual components. 
Lastly, the decision to control serial filings with the blanket prohibitions 
on discharge in § 1328(f) also swung the pendulum too far off center.225 If there 
truly are no changes in the debtor’s personal or financial circumstances warranting 
                                                                                                                
 222. Supra note 30. 
 223. Just to cite a couple of examples, the number of exceptions to the stay in § 
362(b) has grown from nine to twenty-eight. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (Supp. III 1979), 
with 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (2012). And the number of exceptions to preference recovery has 
expanded from seven to ten. Compare § 547(c) (Supp. III 1979), with § 547(c) (2012).  
 224. The number of exceptions to discharge in § 523(a) has nearly doubled since 
the original enactment of the Code. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (Supp. III 1979), with 11 
U.S.C. § 523(a) (2012).    
 225. See supra note 223 and accompanying text; cf. Branigan v. Bateman (In re 
Bateman), 515 F.3d 272, 283 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting the protections or benefits available 
under Chapter 13, other than discharge, that might be an incentive for a debtor to file for 
relief even when § 1328(f) applies).  
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the chapter 13 filing in the two or four years, as the case may be, because of the 
earlier bankruptcy filing, the court has the authority to deny plan confirmation 
under § 1322(a)(3).226 Generally speaking, good faith offers a far more sensitive 
instrument for detecting cases undertaken with improper ulterior intent than a 
prophylactic rule that sweeps up the innocent with the guilty. 
2. Hardship Discharge 
Under the current chapter 13, a debtor who cannot complete her plan due 
to circumstances not of her own making will seek modification and, if that is not 
practicable, a hardship discharge under § 1328(b). The additional condition that 
must be satisfied in order for the court to grant a hardship discharge, beyond the 
debtor not being accountable for the circumstances causing her inability to 
complete the plan, and no practical ability to modify, is that the debtor must have 
paid out at least 70% of what they would have received in a chapter 7 liquidation 
to unsecured creditors. The hardship discharge is of course subject to all of the      
§ 523(a) exceptions, a fact that was more meaningful in the past than it is today. 
Bearing in mind that the plan for the new chapter 13 calls for the near-
total elimination of modification,227 some expansion in the scope of the hardship 
discharge would be a pivotal part of the settlement between the debtor and her 
creditors, lest debtors otherwise be discouraged from using chapter 13 at all. Of 
necessity, the requirement in § 1328(b)(3), that the debtor show modification is 
impractical, would have to be discarded.228 Secondly, the stipulation that the 
debtor have paid out 70% of the amount that unsecured creditors would have 
received in a chapter 7 liquidation should probably be lowered to a level that is 
perhaps in the neighborhood of 50% of the amount produced by the enhanced best 
interests test, but certainly lower than the current standard. While creditors would 
of course risk coming out worse under this standard than under the current rule, 
that peril would appear to be a fair tradeoff for the possibility of also coming out 
better than they would have in a hypothesized chapter 7 liquidation should the 
debtor complete, or nearly complete, the plan.229 
With regard to secured debts, creditors would, as they do currently, retain 
their lien, along with the allied right to foreclose upon default. However, it should 
be clear that, under § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i)(I)(bb), it is only the secured portion of the 
debt, as determined under §§ 502 and 506(a)(1), that remains subject to the lien if 
the debtor completes the plan. That is, the lien would be, as is currently true, 
                                                                                                                
 226. Several courts have made the same point in rejecting the argument that         
§ 1328(f), when applicable, should be construed to bar the stripping of underwater liens 
consistent with BAPCPA’s goal of rebalancing the scales in creditors’ favor. See, e.g., 
HSBC Bank v. Blendheim (In re Blendheim), 803 F.3d 477, 492–94 (9th Cir. 2015); In re 
Scantling, 754 F.3d 1323, 1329–30 (11th Cir. 2014); Branigan v. Davis (In re Branigan), 
716 F.3d 331, 337–38 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 227. See supra Section III.E. 
 228.  11 U.S.C. § 1328(b)(3) (2005).  
 229. Supra text accompanying note 115. 
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relinquished upon the granting of either a full or a hardship discharge.230 The 
continuation of exclusion of all classes of nondischargeable debts from the 
hardship discharge also seems appropriate, as does the exclusion for long-term 
debts under § 1322(b)(5).231 
G. Miscellany 
The foregoing represents a canvass painted with a broad brush; it 
overlooks a lot of the detail of chapter 13, and we all know where the devil resides. 
On the other hand, as this undertaking is intended to stimulate thought and further 
discussion regarding future chapter 13 reform, it is not clear that there is much 
more to be gained by drilling further into the minutiae, other than to make a few 
remarks relating to the subject. First, it seems a forgone conclusion that the new 
chapter 13 should include a good-faith requirement. It is not clear, however, that 
good faith needs to be tested both at filing and again at confirmation.232 Thus, 
either § 1322(a)(3) or 1322(a)(7) could be eliminated without much loss. Second, 
retention of the co-debtor stay is also desirable because it serves to promote 
creditor equality.233 Third, as noted earlier,234 shortening the commitment period is 
critical to increasing the attractiveness and success rate of chapter 13, even though 
it would likely mean fewer debtors could meet the confirmation standards.235 
Nonetheless, those that would be excluded were neither likely to have chosen 
chapter 13 in the first place nor, in the few cases where they would, to have 
successfully completed their plans. Fourth, the new chapter 13 would determine 
the appropriate extent of judicial supervision to be exercised over postpetition 
events and circumstances in order to enhance the prospects for the debtor’s 
successful rehabilitation.236 Finally, there may also be some benefit to liberalizing 
                                                                                                                
 230. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(5)(B)(I)(bb) (2012). 
 231. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(1) (2012). 
 232. Bearing in mind that Code § 1324(b) requires that the court must hold a 
confirmation hearing within 45 days of the § 341(a) meeting of creditors, which itself must 
occur between 21 and 50 days of the filing of the petition (FED. R. BANKR. P. 2003(a)), in 
most chapter 13 cases, the plan will be confirmed, and the trustee will begin disbursing 
payments to creditors, within four to six months after the case is commenced. 
 233. See 11 U.S.C. § 1301(a) (2012). The legislative history of the Code indicates 
that creditors would use the threat of collection against a co-debtor in order to secure 
favored treatment in the case. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 32, at 121–22. With that 
pressure off, the debtor is free to deal with that creditor on the same basis as all other 
similarly situated creditors. 
 234. See supra text accompanying note 186. 
 235. This would occur in cases where the debtor had inadequate income to meet 
the enhanced best interests test within 36 months, unless grounds existed for an extension. 
 236.  Compare In re Fields, 551 B.R. 424, 426–27 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2016) (ruling 
that unless a debtor is engaged in business, court approval is not required in order to incur 
postpetition debt or obtain postpetition credit), with In re Ward, 546 B.R. 667, 678–79 
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2016) (finding that bankruptcy court approval is necessary whenever 
significant postpetition debt is incurred by chapter 13 debtor because of the possible impact 
that such debt may have on debtor’s plan).  
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the rules on classification of claims in the case of business debtors when it can be 
shown that the favored class is essential to the business’s prospects for survival.237 
Probably the most impactful reform in terms of the success of new 
chapter 13, however, has nothing at all to do with chapter 13. Rather, whether 
through amendment of the Fair Credit Reporting Act238 or other legislation, it 
entails taking steps to assure that chapter 13 debtors are rewarded insofar as their 
credit reports are concerned for electing to choose repayment over liquidation.239 
Indeed, until relatively recently, chapter 13 filers were actually penalized for 
choosing repayment, since creditors would continue to report a debt as past-due 
throughout the duration of the plan.240 Anecdotally, in some number of cases, they 
still do, which means not only ensuring fairer reporting rules, but also beefing up 
mechanisms for detecting noncompliance and the penalties for violations.241 If 
there is an honest desire to create positive incentive for debtors to opt for chapter 
13, no enticement will loom as large as the promise of good credit.242 
                                                                                                                
 237. Currently, classification is permitted under § 1322(b)(1) provided that there 
is no “unfair discrimination” against a class so designated. However, under the same 
provision, the standard for classification of a consumer debt on which another individual is 
jointly liable with the debtor is more liberal, and it is here that reference to business debts 
essential to the continuation of the business might be included. 
 238. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2015). There is also limited case law suggesting that 
inaccurate credit reporting may be a violation of the discharge injunction of Code § 524(a). 
See In re Luedtke, No. 02-35082-svk, 2008 WL 2952530, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Wisc. July 31, 
2008). 
 239. This was actually one of the recommendations of the National Bankruptcy 
Review Commission in order to encourage debt repayment. See NBRC REPORT, supra note 
3, at 291 (recommendation 1.5.8). 
 240. See Paul Toscano, Reflections on Poverty, Bankruptcy, and Heresy, 18-DEC 
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RESOURCE GUIDE, FAQ 28 (Consumer Data Industry Assoc., Rev. Dec. 2009); see also Jean 
Braucher, Counseling Consumer Debtors to Make Their Own Informed Choices--A 
Question of Professional Responsibility, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 165, 168 (1997) 
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chapter 7 may even be preferred by creditors”). See generally Julapa Jagtiani & Wenli Li, 
Credit Access After Consumer Bankruptcy Filing: New Evidence, 89 AM. BANKR. L.J. 327 
(2015) (noting that while a chapter 13 file remains on a debtor’s credit file for less time than 
a chapter 7 filing, empirical evidence suggests new lenders do not treat chapter 13 debtors 
more favorably than their chapter 7 counterparts). 
 241. Cf. Kara J. Bruce, Vindicating Bankruptcy Rights, 75 MD. L. REV. 443, 445 
n.5 (2016) (citing media reports about large national lenders who allegedly failed to 
accurately report debt that had been removed through bankruptcy). 
 242. See Elizabeth Doyle O’Brien, Minimizing the Risk of the Undeserved Scarlet 
Letter: An Urgent Call to Amend § 1681E(B) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 57 CATH. U. 
L. REV. 1217, 1217 (2008) (“A poor credit history is the ‘Scarlet Letter’ of 20th century 
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IV. LIMITATIONS OF THE SETTLEMENT MODEL 
Understanding, and thus redesigning, chapter 13 in terms of a settlement 
highlights certain attributes that we tend to think about when we reflect on private-
dispute settlements. These concepts, such as reasonableness, compromise, and 
collaboration, can be useful in ultimately producing a facility that is ideal to none 
but, hopefully, acceptable to all. However, while positive and helpful conceptual 
extensions are a byproduct of metaphoric reasoning, the picture is never 
completely accurate. As noted,243 there are key ways in which chapter 13 is not 
like a settlement, and those asymmetries are, if not lost to view, at least thrust to 
the background when we imagine chapter 13 purely as a settlement. This is a 
natural consequence of metaphoric reasoning, highlighting similarities that 
concepts share, but also eclipsing differences between the source and target 
concepts.244 
Thus, it is worth pausing before drawing this effort to a close to 
emphasize the limitations entailed in modeling the target concept, new chapter 13, 
on the source concept of settlement. First, this settlement is not voluntary; it is 
being imposed by positive law.245 Second, its terms are being driven based not on 
what the parties would have agreed to if given the opportunity to bargain, but 
what, as a matter of policy, we believe they should have agreed to take into 
account–broader social and economic policy considerations that simply do not 
animate private-settlement negotiations.246 Third, in the context of private debtor–
creditor workouts, the impact of the agreement on the debtor’s other creditors is 
not a significant factor. In bankruptcy, however, it is a hugely important factor, as 
considerations of ratable distribution and creditor equality loom as large as the 
justifications that underlie the policy in favor of providing a debtor with a fresh 
start.247 This is why it is necessary to evaluate the treatment of creditors in new 
chapter 13 from the vantage point of the distributional norms of federal bankruptcy 
law and not state debt collection law.248 In sum, then, the new chapter 13 will 
demand more of both debtors and creditors than they likely would be willing to 
concede in a private negotiation. Nevertheless, the key to remaining as true as 
                                                                                                                
America”) (citing the testimony of Anthony Rodriguez, Staff Attorney for the National 
Consumer Law Center, before Fair Credit Reporting Act: How it Functions for Consumers 
and the Economy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit of the 
H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th Cong. (2003)). 
 243. See supra Part II. 
 244. This is the hiding power of metaphor, a phenomenon of which we are often 
unaware because pervasive metaphoric reasoning is in cognitive processing. See Ponoroff & 
Knippenberg, supra note 139, at 2286 (citing GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, 
METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 184 (1980)). 
 245. Creditors no longer vote on confirmation as they did under chapter XIII. See 
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 246. See supra text accompanying note 52. 
 247. See supra note 54. 
 248. See supra text accompanying note 69. 
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practicable to what a person in the position of each of the players with an interest 
in a chapter 13 case should reasonably agree to in such a negotiation produces not 
only a workable system, but one that also has more staying power than a system 
that clashes violently with the desires of the parties actually involved in the case.249 
At the same time, it is for these reasons that the notion of settlement 
cannot be granted a conceptual monopoly over the design and implementation of 
new chapter 13. Ideally, it can be a useful starting place and a guiding star, but it 
can only aid, and not be permitted to tyrannize, analysis. This frees us, when 
necessary to achieve countervailing policy objectives, to divert attention away 
from the entailments of the settlement metaphor to larger considerations of public 
policy. It is in this important sense that the present approach parts company with 
strict contractarian analysis.250 
CONCLUSION 
Ever since rehabilitation for individual debtors arrived on the bankruptcy 
scene it has been a disappointment. Some positive steps were taken in 1978, but 
the decades that followed witnessed mostly backsliding in the development of a 
viable procedure for individual-debt adjustment. In part, this may be due to the 
contentious nature of bankruptcy reform since 1978.251 But, likely, it is also partly 
a product of the fact that we have never settled on a consistent ideation of chapter 
13. In recent years we have gradually repositioned chapter 13 from a haven for the 
virtuous to a desolate landscape for the villainous. Moreover, so long as we 
envision the contours of chapter 13 from the perspective of a battle between 
debtors and creditors, it is unlikely that an optimum balance will ever be struck. 
Thus, in this treatment, this Article has proposed that we proceed from the 
mindset of chapter 13 being the product of a reasonable accommodation between 
parties with adverse interests, rather than a contest in which there must be a 
distinct winner and loser. New chapter 13, as dubbed in this Article, would 
mediate between debtor protection and creditor rights. The aim would be to 
produce a result that, while not to anyone’s liking completely, should present an 
option to many debtors that is more advantageous than chapter 7. At the same 
                                                                                                                
 249. This is arguably the mistake that Congress has made since the original 
enactment of chapter 13 in 1978, and it is certainly the mistake made in post-1978 
amendments to the statute. See supra notes 102–05 and accompanying text. 
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time, creditors would be accorded the meaningful promise of a better outcome than 
chapter 7 and provided sufficient protection against debtor abuse so as to warrant 
their support. Not only would such a settlement work to the benefit of both groups, 
but it could also eliminate the need to means test debtors in chapter 7, an exercise 
that has proved burdensome and costly, but not particularly effective. 
As stated earlier, this proposal is not intended to be a blueprint for 
specific legislative action, but rather an illustration of how such an approach might 
be used to spur a constructive discussion about the future of chapter 13. The idea 
of individual debtor rehabilitation is a salutary one, and, in the right circumstances, 
should be providential to all concerned. The fact that, thus far, history proves that 
it cannot be achieved either with a bludgeon or as a sinecure does not mean it 
cannot be achieved at all, and, surely, the social and economic payoffs are worth 
another effort to get it right. 
 
